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CHAPTER I
INTRODUC'fION TO THE PROBLEl1
OF' ASSENT

Early in 1870, John Henry Newman finished his last great work which he

modestJ.y entitJ.ed ~ Easy

!.!l ~ 2!!

Grunar

2! A8sent. 1

Since the writ.1ng of

the Grammar
cri tioal opinion as to ita value and meaning hu been atr.i.ki.ngly
,,

d1v1ded.

'lh1s divergence can be traced baok to many factors: Newman's contpli-

aated and detailed style, his personal and otten strange use of tem1nology,
and the dept.h and originalityof' his thought.

The primary d1tficul1;l', however,

seau to stem from. Newman's purpose and approach.
is a difficult book to understand.

All admit that the Grammar

It begins without pretatory remarks, With-

out aplanation ot over-all purpoae, and, seemingly, Without any easill' intelli""
gible internal order.

Moreover, Newman handles an old topic........sHnt and

certitude, am the process ot reaching theJll-o.with an unexpected and SOmetimes
u.nsuspected originality.

The result according to Father Francis Bacchus is that

The Grammar of Assent i& 'one of the moat obscure books that haa ever
been writ ten:- Dis tingu1shed philosophers have been known openl.y t.o
avow t.hat they could make nothing of it, and, without being quite 80
outspoken, its critios as a rule betray the same sense of its obscurity by the eagerness nth which they fasten upon irrelevant sideissues when disoussing it, or b,y the vague, non~oommittal character
of their utteranoes • • • It is the old ataxy ot readers unable to
get into touch with their author because their minds are moVing in

It

lJolm Benxy Newman, ~ Essst

I,London, 1892).

!!l!!9. g! !.
1

Grammar

.2! Assent.

New edition

2

one circle of ideas and his
prepared for originality on
that there is scope tor it.
of old controversies is the

in another • • • • His readers are not
so large a scale. They cannot conceive
Sroc freshness in handling the details
utmost they expeot.2

One reason for this obsourity in the GrammSf" real or notI' is the dif'.fi-

ulty of expressing adequately the ideas cont.a1ned in it.

Newman had thought

ugh and prayed. over its main themes for over thirty years.

He had beglin the

emmar many times only to leave off beoause he could not clarify to his awn

atisfaction the ideas which fot, years he had vaguely and then more olearly
ali zed.

The major a.OO l..<nportant insight wbich wu to ixnpel him to work in

arnest had come in 1866, only foUl' years before he finally finished his work.
lelmlan's state of mind betore, du.ring, and atter writing the Grammar i.s a.ptly

enected in this entry in his journal of late 1870.
'ssay on Assent last March, I have meant to make

III

"Since I published IllY'

memorandum on the subjeot of

It is the upshot of a very long deSire and effort-I don t t know the worth
f it, but I am happier to have at length done it and got it off my hands • • •

book itself I have aimed at writing this twenty years;-arld now that it is

tten I do not quite recognize it for what it was meant to be, though I supsuoh.

I have made lrtOre attel!lpts at writing it, than I can enu-

However, even 'With these elements oJ: obscurity, Newman's general purpose

s easily disoovered by reading the title of his book; it is a grammar of asThe sense in which Newman

USGS

grammar is in accordance with the fourth

2Franois Bacohus, "How to Read the t Grammar of Assent, t" The r'Iontfu
III (February 1924), 106.
3John Henry Newman, Autobioiraph1cal Wr1tiggs, ad. H. Tristram (New. York,

:57

• 269.

naaning given to the 'WOrd by websterts Dictionary: "the elements or principles
of any science or art . . . . "4 Assent is the mental adherence to a proposition

!)r a truth.
More specifically, Newmants ultimate aim is not a general discussion and
~eten8e of

lin

assent in itself, but. rather the juat1!'ication of the aasent present

or

an act of faith, the just:U'lcation

~emonstrate

the content of that faith.

the faith

or

the believer who cannot

"I have said above," writes W:U.frid

~d, "that the one avowed object of the 'Essay on Assent' was to show that

191mple and uneducated minds co"uJ.d have rational grounds tor belief 1n Chrlsti~ty without knoldedge of its sCientific evidences. ,,5

Newman never eXplicitly

Ftates this PUIpose in the Qrammar, although he does devote two chapters to
~hoW1.ng
~vidence

hOll

one proceeds in giVing assent to various truths of fa1th. 6 Further

of purpose is found on the title page of the Or8llll1ar in the quotation

rrom St. Ambrose which indicates the moti.! o£
plaouit.E!2. sal'V'Ulrf. face" popl1lum

Illum.

the book. Non in dialectic a com-

--

-

It is not God's pleasure to bring HiS

people to salvation through arguments, through syllogisms.
The need for such a

just~ioation

of faith is clear if' one realizes to

what extent rationalism had conquired the minds of intellectuals in the lat.

nineteenth century.

Newman briefly states the main a.rguments of this phUosophy

in a sermon which he prea.ched at the opening of an English seminary in l813,

4l'lebster t s Colleelat.e Diction&;t;i, 5th ad. (Springfield, :f.1a8s., 1944),p.433.
5\P1Ufrid Ward,

246 ..

!!!! ~ .2! ~

P.enry Cardinal Newma'1 (New York, 1912, II,

6wewman, GrIll'J!l&.r.. See Chapter V, "Apprehension and Assent in the Matter of
Religion" and Chapter X, "Inference am Assent in the Matter of Religion. 11

three years after the publication o£ the Grammar.

He says:

The elementary proposition of this new philosophy whioh 18 now so
threatening is this--that in all things we must go by reason, in
nothing by f ai tb, that tbini;;;& are known and are to be reoeived 80

are as they oan be proved.

Its advocates say, au other knowledge

has proof-why should religion be an exception?

And the 1ItOde of
proof is to advance from what we know to what we do not know, i'rom
sensible and tangible facts to sound oonclusions • • • • Why
should not that method which has done so much in physios, avall
also as regards that higher knowledge whioh the world has believed
it had gained through revelation? There is no revelation from
above. There is no exercise of faith. Seeing and proving is the
only ground for believing.. They go on to say, that since proof
admits of degrees, a demonstration can hardly be had except in
mathematics, we never CM haft s1mple knowledge, truths are only
probably such. So that faith 1s a mistake in two ways. First,
because it usurps the place of reason~ and secondlY' because it
implies an absolute assent to doctrines, and is dogmatic, which
absolute assent is irrational.?

The "new philosophy" which Jie1b.8n mentions was in fact an old enemy of
his.

It was the religious liberalism of his Oxf'ord days under a slightly dif-

ferent guise.

This Oxford liberalism attempted to subJeot revealed doct:r1ne to

the judgment of the human intellect alone) it claimed to pus sentence on doctrines of faith which in truth rested on Divine Authority.
To gain a clearer idea of the over-glorification of reason implied in the
philosophy of religious rationalism, one ba8 only to read the propositions
listed in the !\pol0taa
sity days.
1.

~

.!l!!!!! whioh

were currant du.rl.ng Newman's univer-

bong them are the follOwing four.
No religious tenet is important, unless reason shows it to ba so.
Therefore, e.g. the doctrine of the Athanasian Creed 1s not
to be insisted on, unless it tends to convert the soul • • • •

7John Henry Newman, "The Infidel1 ty

~ other Unpublished Sermons

.2!

of the Fu. ture, n Faith and Prejudioe
Cardinal Newman (New York, i9~ PP. l2j...i24.

2.

3.

4.

No one oan believe what he does not understand.
Therefore, e.g. there are no mysteries in true religion.
No theological doctrine 18 any thing more than an opinion
which happens to be held by bodies of men.

Therefore,. e.g. no creed, as such, is neoess&r,f for salvation.
It i8 dishonest in a man to make an act of faith in what he
has not had brought home to him by' actual proof.
Therefore, e.g. the mu. of men ought not absolutely to
believe in the diVine author! ty of the Bible. 8

Ii' one keeps in mind that :reason for an Oxford rationalist was reduced to

scientific demonstration, it will be easy to see that faith, besides being
wholly subjeot to the investigation of reason, became equal to the oonclusion

ot a syllogism.

The obvious

result of suoh an attitude was that anyone who

could not justify his faith by fomal and eJCplicit proof was a sentimentalist.
This, of oourse, placed most believers, iboth eduoated and uneduoated, in the

unenviable position of being irrational and superstitious.
Furthemore, absolute and unoonditioned assent to a. doatrine of faith was
itself unjustifiable.

Absolute and unconditioned assent could be given only

to a strict demonstration. But such demonstration was hardly to be e3Peoted
except in mathematics.

The assent

or

faith, therefore, since it lay outside the

area of striot demonstration, could be given oonditionaLly, but never absolutely.

One might at best have high probability in matters of faith and call it

practical certitude.

The religious rationalism of 1870 dii'lered little frOl'l1 the rationalism or

religious liberalism of Newntan t s Oxf'ord days, except that it we no longer more

BJohn Henry Newman, Apoloea PlJ!

p.

294.

!!!! Sua.

New Edition (London, 1897),

6
or les8 confined to certain clergymen of the Church of England, but had become
conlflon anong scientists and intellectuals

8S

well.

It was in order to justify the assent of .faith that Ne_an had first to
justify assent itself as an absalute and unconditioned rational aot.

This anal-

ysis and defense of assent is the direct and proximate aim of the Grammar.

The

method used by' Ne_an is one of psychological. analysis of the mind in its operations

or

inference and assent.

As such the Grammar, has muoh philosophical

import.

Newman t 8 ohief adversary in the _tter of assent was John Locke and his
Ita priori tt epistemological theories.9

Locke held that there are degrees of

assent and that assent should be proportionate to the given eVidence.

If the

evidenoe was striotly demonstrable (or perceptual), and therefore oertain, the
couequent asssnt Should be ab80lute and unoonditioned.

If the eVidence was

only probable, as in reasoning about all concrete matters, then the assent
should only be a probable and conditioned one.
i1o_ and conolusions of this doctrine

aB

Newman summarizes the proposi-

follows: "The authors to whom I refer

Wish to maintain that there arE! degrees of assent, and that, as the reason. for
a propOSition are strong or weak, so is the assent.

It follows from this that

abaolute assent has no legi taa:te eDl"Oise, except as ratifying acts of intuit10n or demonstration.

What 1s thus brought home to us is indeed to be accepted

unconditionally; but, as to reasonings in oonorete matters, they are never more

9 Newman, Grammar, pp. 159"164. Here Newman identifies Locke as bis ohief
adversary in the matter of assent. The passaL;es quoted from Locke are contained in his An Easy Goncerry1lyi Human Understandi,ng (London, n.d.), pp. 556,

561., 562, 589 ...'590.

.

7
than probabilities, and the probability in each conclusion which we draw is the
measure of our assent to that oonolusion. "10

However, Locke admitted that

some propositions bordered so near to strict

proof and oertainty that an absolute assent was given, as 1£ the knowledge were
certain.

Nevertheless such assent was illogioal, immoral, and contrary to a

love of truth.
Ne1t!Ilan opposes Locke on many points.

The first and most general onti-

ciem is that Lookets views are not in aooordanoe with experience.

"He (Looke)

takes a view of the human mind, in relation to inferenoe and assent, which to
me seems theoretioal and unreal.

Reasonings arxi conviotions whioh I deem

natural and legitimate, he apparentJ.y would oall irrational, enthusiastio, per-

verse, and irnnloralJ and that, as I think, because he oonsults his own ideal of
how the mind ought to act, l..nstead of interrogating human nature, as an eXisting thing, as it is found in the world.. "11

1-1ore specifically, Newman argues that Looke's pOSition on degrees of as..
sent contuses assent with the inferential. conclusion.

The result is that as-

sent becomes the "eoho" or "shadow tl of an inferenoe and not a distinct act.
If, when one assents, he does preoisely what he does in interring-except that

his assent 1s a reproduction of his inferenoe--then assent "ls simply supernuous, in a psychological. point of View, and a ouriosi ty tor subtle minds, and
the sooner it is got out ot the -.y the better."12

-

12Ibid., 165.

8
Moreover, there are many cases of assents which are given in concrete
~atters

on evidence short of immediate perception and striot demonstration.

Rather obvious exar'lples are II,Jreat Britain is an island, rt l'IThere actually exist
oities whioh go by the names of New York, Rome, and Berlin," "Roosevelt died in

1945,

It

"I was born," "I shall die, If "My friend i&5 true to me. If

These proposi-

tions, strictly speaking, cannot be proved, nor are they here and now objects of
perception.

Yet, under no mal circumstanC)es, unoonditioned assent is given to

them.

Rere difficulties arise.

valid?

Are suoh absolute and unoonditioned assents

Is not Locke's teaching more in aooord with correct philosophical

thinki~~?

Is not the door opened to all kinds of error and subjectivism 1£ the

mind is allowed to "add" something in its interpretation of evidence?

Newman

answers that human nature oOOL"!lands these assents, that oonsequent error is aooidental, and finally that Locke t s theory is not in acoord wi. th the normal operations of the human mind.

"Assent on reasonings not demonstrative, If he says, "i8

too widely reoognized an act to be irrational" unless man' 8 nature is irrational
too familiar to the prudent and clear-minded to be an infirmity or an extravagance.

None ot us can think or act Without the acceptance of truths, not in-

tuitive, not demonstrated, yet sovereign. "1.3

A question, however, still remains.
assent in contingent matters?

What are the oonditions necessary for

Granted that truth is the object of assent, why

and how does the mind so often pass from inferences not strictly demonstrative

l.3Ibid.. 179.-

9

to absolute and unconditioned assent, to assent whioh is tree from the fear of
Th1s is NeWDlan' s main problem in the Grammar

error?

.2!. Assent.

Ris task lies

in determining h::>w the mind attains truth in concrete matters by a process other
than strict demonstration.

"But what presents some difficulty is thiS, how 1 t

is that a conditional aooeptance ot a proposition,-suoh as is an aot of inference,-is able to lead as it does, to an unconditional acceptance of 1t,-suoh
as 1s assent, how it is that a proposition whioh is not, and oannot be, demonstrated, whioh at the highest oan only be proved to be truth-like, not true,
suoh as "I shall die, n nevertheless claims and receives our unqualified ad.he810n" "14
~lew.man'

s solution to the problem of truth 1n the ooncrete is the Ulative

Sense.1 5 The Illative Sense is, in brief, the power of the mind to arrive at
trllth in ooncrete, oontingent c1roumst&nces.

The purpose of this thesiS wUl

be to study Newmants Illative Sense in relation to assent, and as the solution

to the problem of assent in oontingent oircumstances.

This thesis Will shoW

how the mind, acoording to Nell1lan, passes .from a conditioned inference to an un....
oonditioned assent.

First,

t~retore ..

it w:U1 be necessar.r to show how, why,

and under what conditions the illative Sense conaludes to truth in concrete
~atte:rs.

Seoondly, it wUl be necessary to shoW how the Illative Sense acts as

a sanction for assent.
'the reason tor this thesis is twofold.

First, Ne_a..'1's answer to the

15Newman usually capitalizes mative Sense.
in this throughout this thesis.

I will, therefore, follow him

10

problem of assent is so often misunderstood because of the detail and descrip·
~ive
~he

manner of his writing, because of his peculiar terminology, and because of
intricacy of his thought.

Secondly, most authors in their criticism of the

Pr8llar either concern themselves With other important, thought less essential"
problems, or treat the Illative Sense and the passage to truth and assent inadequately, and sometimes inaccurately, in a paraphrase or brier review.
~~ather

D'Arcy in

!!l!.

Nature

.2!. _~
.......i_et... i.l.1n.'l<:s

~tellectualJ16 Father Boekraad in his
~

1... !!.

!2!

'!'hus

the illative Sense to be non-

Personal Conque~t

2! Truth According

Newman, while he considers the _same general problem, hardly mentions

the mative Sense;11 and Dr. Zena in his Newman, ~.!!!l.!2 CertitudeJ con-

cerns himself more With proofs for the illative Sense than with an analysiS of
1t.18
Sinoe Newman I s terminology is too often a oause of misunderstanding, and
sinoe a grasp of his use of words is neoessary for this thesiS, the second
tlhapter will be devoted to an oplanation of the more 1..1'Ilportant terms.

16r.f. C. D'Aroy,

!h! Nature 9! a,ellef

(London, 1931), p. 151.

17A. J. Boekraad, The Personal. Conquest of Truth Acoording to J. H. Newman
Louvain, 1955).
.
- - -

lOp. Zeoo, ~ Hang NelInan, ~!!l ~ ~rtitude (Leiden, 1957).

CHAPTER II
NE.'WMANtS TKOONOLOOY

"Half the oontroversies in the world are verbal ones; and could they be
brought to

8

plain issue, they would be brought to a prompt termination • • • •

1:lhen men understand each other's meaning, they see, for the most part, that
controversy is either superfluous or hopeless. ttl

These words with whioh tfe_an

ends his OXford sermon, "Faith and R&ason Contrasted as Habits of

an appropriate opening for this seoond chapter.

~1'indtt

provide

Much of the dif'ficul ty with

and misunderstanding of Newman·a teaching during the past years has as its cause
his personal use of words.

The various interpretations of the term Illative

Sense. tor example, bear witness to this. 2 Yet wittlout an understanding of
tffllmlantS terminology, one can hardly hope to grasp his solution to the problem

or

truth in the oonorete.
Theretore, this seoond cha.pter W1l.l first examine and e.xplain the more im-

portant tems

or

the Grammar, and secondly show both their place in the work and

their mutual relations to one another.

The order followed is more or less

IJohn Henry =~ewman, "Faith and Reason Contra.sted as Habits of Kind, u
FitteenSemona Preached Before ~ University 2.! Oxford, ,3rd ad. (London, 1918),
pp. 200-f51.
2J)fArcy, PP. 148-149, 151, Thomas Harper, "On MOl'al, tI ~ H:mtg, AlII
(November 1870), $4$.

11

12
patterned alter that employed by Newman.

This procedure is not perfect, but it

does avoid as tar as possible any lOSical gaps.

The first important distinction is between concrete
and abstract.
,
which 1s conorete 1s particular, singular, and individuated.

'rhat

Concrete matter

(a tem lIhioh Newman often uses) is contingent matter, it refers to the real.
world ot individual beings who are subject to many laws, lalls which often conilict with or modi.ly one another.

The concrete order is the area With which

Newman is primarily oonoerned in bis treatment of assent3 and the area in which
the nlative Sense operates.4 The concrete oreier, because it is the order of

things,

or

living persons, of color, sound, and touoh, leads to action and
"Persons influenoe us, voices melt us, looks subdue us, deeds in-

praotice.5
name us.

Many a man wUl live <l<"ld die upon a dogma: no man will. be a martyr

for a conclusion • • • • No one, I say, Will die for his own oalculations: he
dies for realities.,.6

That whioh is abstraot, on tbeother hand, is without individuating notes.
The abstract order is the order of what Newman calls a notion,7 that is, of the

universal. idea and law, of the general non-particular statement.

3Newman, Grammar, p. 7.

317, 354-355.
-5Ibid., 89.
6Ibid., 93.
7Ibid., 9.
4Ibid.,

-

The abstract

1)

refers also to anything that is potentially concrete, but actually abstract
since it has not been experienced and realized. 8 The name Stali~ is abstract or in the notional order i f one has never seen the oity or i f one has
never famed any imaginative pioture of it.

ttVarium at mutabile semper femin&"

is abstract if one has never had the experienoe of a fiokle woman.9
A sOienoe, aooording to Ne1llt8n, since it deals With universal and general

~awslO is limited to the abstract.

In this order soienoe arrives at truth,ll

but ita laws oannot detel'llline the concrete.

Soientifio laws cannot be employed

in the oonorete order of interacting causalities without adjustment, Without a
oall to aperienoe and prudance.12 Moreover, demonstration, that is, Itriot

IProof, is impossible in the ooncrete 'because the tems of its premisa.. are
abstract. 1)

Ne1llltan oalls knowledge ot the concrete
~prehension

1tem.s.14

By the

HelIbI.an se_s to equa't!!t apprehenSion with understandiDg in one section

-

-

9lbid., 11.
10Ibid., 284.

-

llIbid., 219.
12Ibid.

-'

278-279.

l)Ibid., 8.

-

abstract apprehension.

of a propOSition is meant one's imposition of a sense on its

8lbid., 9-10.

-

am

14!bid., 9.

14
of the QrllmJllar,lS but farther on ha notes that they are not the same since it

is possible to apprehend without understanding.16

That John, lor example, is

Joan's brotherfs Wife's sister's uncle may be apprehended without being understood.

Understanding then Means lor Ne_all a clear, penetrating grasp, while

apprehension has a wider significance, ranging from. a m.ere superficial know-

ledge of words to a deeper understanding at the ideas which these words express,
and deeper still to a personal appreoiation of the reality which these ideas

attempt to penetrate.
There are two types of apprehension, real and notional.
sion is knowledge of the concrete and individual.

Real apprehen-

Apprehension is real when

the terms of the apprehended proposition stand "for things Simply external to

us, brought home to us through the experiences and intomat10ns we have ot

them. "17

neal apprehension is the reeuJ. t of vivid experience or memo%)" or

imaginative communioat1on of lived eJlperience.

Real apprehension stirs our will

and emotions &s well as our reason and makes our judgments peculiarly intense

and personaJ.. 18

Notional apprehension, on the other hand, is knowledge about the general
and abstract.

ApprehenSion is notional when the tams of the apprehended pro-

pOSition "stand for certain ideas existing in our own minds, and for nothing

171bid.,

15Ibid., 8.
16Ibid., 19.

-

-

9.

181bid., 12, 28-29.

15
outside of them.,,19

In notional apprehension one graS',t;>s reality as if it were

abstraot, omitting what is conorete and individual in it.
an abstract idea, a universal, or a general concept.
one has varies with each individuaJ..
m~

A notional idea 18

The kind of apprehension

What is a real apprehension for one man

be only a notional apprehension for another. 20
Newman does not contrast real and notional apprehension with each othel'

wi til the resul t that notional apprehension becomes a weak, imperfect real ap...

Each bas its task, its perfection, and Its limitation.

prehension.

liTo

~pre

bend notionally ls to have breadth of mind, but to be shallow; to apprehend

really 1s to be deep, but to be narrow-minded • • • • Without the apprehension
of notions, _

should forever pace round one small circle of knowledaeJ Without

a. firm hold upon things, we shall. waste ourselves in vague speculations. tt2l
FJJal apprehension, however, is "the scope and end and the test of notional. 022

It is the end ot notional apprehension because men commonly try to realize and
appreciate more deeply their ideas; it is the test of notional apprehension
because our ideas are invalid without a correspondence to the real world of
things.

-

19Ibid., 9.

22Ibid.

2OIbid., 10.

2lIbid.,

-

34.
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ASSENT

Assent in its various aspects is the subjeot of the Grammar and its most
important single tem.

assent.

Yet nowhere does Newman oftel' a oomplete definition of

Rather be gives many

inoomp~ete

desoriptions from which a general de-

fini tion can be gathered.
Assent can be del'ined as

t.h~

uncondl tional aooep tance of a PI'oposition as

true,23 as adherence to a proposition without reserve or doubt. 24 Assent is
unconditional precisely beoause its object 1s truth, whether this be recognised
implioitly or eJep1ic1tl.y.2$ Two conclusions immediately follow from this.
First, since the ob,ject of assent is truth, apprehended truth is the condition
under whioh assent is given.

Vividness of apprehension and experience oan at-

fect the intensity of assent, but only acoidentally] it is not essent1alto the
aot. 26 Seoondly, sinoe there are no degrees
no degrees of assent.27

or

truth, there are in consequenoe

Newman uses this as one of his arguments aga1nst John

Locke and his doctrine of degrees of assent. 28
Assent dUfers from apprehension insofar as assent 1s one's intelleotual
reaction to an apprehension.

-

23Ibid., 8, 172, 259.
24Ibid. J 172.

-

25Ibid., 188-189.
26Ibid., 18$.
27Ibid., 174.

-

28Ibid.

Assent is the personal acoeptance of what one has

17
already apprehended as true..

Apprehension then is a necessarJ ooncomitant of

assent.29
Assent differs from an inference in two ways.

First, inference is a ne-

cessar,y condition whioh always precedes assent.30 Seoondly, assent is uncon-

di tional, whUe inferenoe is oonditional.

Inference, whioh is here taken to

mean primarily the oonclusion ot a..'1. ini'erential prooess or a oonclusion fran

prem1sses,31 has two conditions.

First, an inferenoe ot its very nature fo!-

lows .from and depends on its premisses, no matter what their
ence includes in its very obj90t this dependenoe

or

nil1l1ber.

An

infer...

its conolusion upon its

premisses.32 Seoondly, demonstrative or syllogistic inferenoe in concrete reaSalling reaohesonly probability; therefore its oonolusion is only probable.

"Inferenoe is oonditional, because a conclusion at least implies the assumption
of premisses, and stUl more, because in ooncrete matter, on which

r am engaged,

demonstration is impossible."33
Assent, on the other hand, is t4,eonditiona1; it is the
propOSition as true, and not as probable.

accap~~oe

ot a

Furthermore, the object of assent

does not include a dependence upon premisses.

For once a conclUSion is reoog-

nized as true 1nsofar as it proceeds .from true premisses, it can be recognized

-

29Ibid., 8, 157.

31 Ibid. Premiss is the second spelling. It is, however, the spelling
which Ne'WWln uses., I wUl, therefore, follow him in this.

-

32Ibid...

-

40.

33Ibid., 8.
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as trtle in itself.

There is then no longer any need for premisses.

Tho con-

clusion can be held as true even if the premisses are forgotten.34
Assent, finally, as considered in the Grammar, is a free and responsible
aet3S which recognized truth can cOM!Iland but not torce.

Such an act ot assent

is tree because Newman deals with assent in concrete matter where there is no
striot demonstration to oompel it.
There are two divisions of assent.

well-known real and notional assent.

The first division is between the

Real. assent is assent given to a real ap-

prehension, to the conorete, the experienced, the realized.36 Notional assent
is Given to the abstract, the general, and the unexperienced.)7 Real assent,
though not necessarily practical,38 does excite the afteotions and stir the
mind and will, for the ooncrete exercises a toroe which nothing abstract can

34Ib1d., 40. The following quotation from Father Francis Bacchus, though
long, may help clarity the dependenoe of inference upon its premisses. "The
teaching of the Grammar is that ind'erence and assent are substantially different
mental acts, and not, as many persons seem to regard them, merely d1tferent aspects of one and the s_e act. When a propOSition is being inferred, the direct objeot before the mind is its relations to the premisses from which it is
1nf'erred. But when a propOSition is assented to, the premisses disappear from
view, just as scaffolding vanishes when a building is oompleted, and the proposition in itself becomes the direct objeot before the mind. It is true that
acts o£ inference norma.Uy precede an act of assent and are a. sine ~ua non condition 0:£ its being elicited; but they do not fona part of' the-act it8eU."
Bacchus. p.ll4.
3>Ne_an. Grammar, p. 2)2.

-

36I bid., 9, 38.

-

31Ibid.

-

38Ibid., 82.
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rival.39
ience.

Real assents are personal to each one, depending on onets own e~er
"They depend on pers.>W elq)erience; and the experience of one man is

not the experience of anO'ther. ,,40 Real assent torms the mind and oharaoter.
is the motive cause of greatness.

It

"They (real assents) create, as the case may

be, heroes and saint-s, great leaders, statesmen, preachers, and reformers .. the

pioneers of discovery in science.. viSionaries, fanatiCS, knight-errants, demagogues, and adventurers.

They have given to the world men of O'ne idea, of'

immense energy, of adamantine w.Ul, of revolutionary power."4l
Notional assent, on the other hand, does not stimulate the wID and emotions nO'r lead to action.

Notional a5sent olosely resembles and is sometimes

almost undietinguisha'ble from the interential oonolusion, Since the apprehension oommon to' both is notional. 42 There are various types of notional assent,43 ranging trons mere passive and superfioial assertion44 to speculation,
the f1rm, oonsoiO'us aoceptanoe of abstraot proPO'sitions as
not necessarily disparage notional assent.

true.45

Ne~an

Speculation, for example, is the

firm adherence of the mind to mat.hematlcal truths, to the abstract laws of

-

.39 Ibid. , 36.

-

4OIbid., 83.

-

hllbid., 88.

-

42Ibid., .39.
43Protession, Credenoe, Opinion, Presumption, and SpeculatiO'n.

-

44Ibid.,

-

42.

4'Ibid., 73.

does
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sciences such as phUosophy and theology.46 Furthermore, there are many truths,
such as mysteries, "God is One in Three," to which one can give only a notional
assent. 47

Real assent, bowever, is the most perfect kind of assent according

to Newman, since its exercise is in the conorete world of real. things.

On

the

other hand "When assents are exercised on notions, they tend to be mere assertions vitbout any personal bold on til_ on the part of those who make them. "48
Assent is also divided into simple and complex assent.

Simple assent,

whether real or notional, is more or less unconSCious, implicit, given Without
full. advertence of the mind, Without direct knowledge.1D

Most of one's aBsents,

especially his first ones, are merely expreSSions or one's personal. likings,

tastes, prejudices, motives, and principles as directed by nature.50 Simple
assents are not neces.arily permanent, but can be lost.51

As one grows older,

for example, he begins to correct or change, after renection and eXperience,
many Simple assents which were but prejudices.52 For this reason, religion de-

mands more than a simple assent; it requires certitude which is complex assent,
or at least a simple assent whiob can be converted into certitude when the occasion demands.53

48Ibid.,
-- 40.
18
-

Simple assent, finally, is called material certitude by

46Ibid.

47Ibid., 52, 124 ff.
188-189, 210.

Ibid. ,

5oIbid., 188, 194
SlIbid., 220.
52Ibid., 194.
53Ibid., 220.
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Newman, that is, the matter from whioh it 1s possible to evolve oertitude.54
Complex or reflex assent is an assent to an assent, a consoious, deliber-

ate assent to a simple assent, whether real or notional.55

Complex assent is

always notional, sinoe the predicate of its proposition is the abstract word

true, or duty, or neoessary.56
in point.

tJThat Ireland is an island is true" is a oase

A seoond nante for oomplex or reflex assent is oonviotion,51 and·

right oonviotion 1s oertitude.58
gives several desoriptive

Certitude therefore is

detin1~lons

It

reflex

act. Newman

of certitudes he calls it "the perception

of a truth with the perception that it is a truth, or the oonsciousness of
knowing, as expressed in the phrase, 'I know that I know, t ..59 "the posseSSion
and enjoyment ot truths,,,60 fla conviotion of what is true, ,,61 "an .active recognition of propOSitions as true. B62

Oertitude when pertect unites the keenness

of real assent and the persistenoe of reflex 8Seent. 6)

-

54Ibid. , 2ll.

-

5)Ibid., 190, 194-195.

-

57Ibid., 195.

-.

58Ibid., 195-196, 221.
59Ibid., 197.

-

6oIbid., 228.

-

6lIbid., 252.

-

62Ibid.,

-

345.

63Ibid., 216.
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The three oonditions of oertitude are first that it follow on investigation and proof, secondly that it be accompanied by a. speoific sense of intelleotual satisfaction, and thirdly that it be irreversible or indefoctible. 64
;')nets

certitudes, ot course, are few; they are limited to various priJ''lary

facts, to elementary points of knoWledge, to the broad principles ot SCience

and histar,y.65 Lastly, certitude according to Newman is otten the result of a
cumulation ot arguments which are in themselves but probable. 66

Here again the

problElll of truth in the concrete must be faced.

Before passing on to an examination of inference, a brief orientation will

-

clarify the place in the Gramntar of various
thus tar.

tel'l'llS

which have been ellplained

First, Newman treats of propoSitions in their bearing on the con-

crete, that is, as they express things and experienoed realities.
ledge at such propoSitions is oalled real apprehension.
oeptance

or

real assent.

The know...

The unconditional ac-

or adherence to a proposition which is really apprehended is called
Ne'Wlllan is primarUy concerned with real assent in the qrammar,

since, as he says, the assent involved in a llvoing act of' faith is either a
real assent or a certitude, whioh in this case is a deliberate reflex notional
assent on a previous real assent.

There yet remains to be explained first the

64Ibiq., 197, 203 ft., 221, 229, 258.
65Ibid., 236, 239-240.
66Ibid" 293, JOl,

23
inferential processes, and seoondly the mative Sense, the organon for ooncluding to truth in concrete, contingent matters.
Interence, in general, is divided into the inferential process of reasoning, the conclWiJion of this process, and the act of adhering conditionally to

this conclusion.

The

inferential oonclusion, as was noted before, is dependent

on its premisses and this dependence is included in its objeot. 67 Inferenoe,
as the process of reasoning, when it is syllOgistic or demonstrative, in con..

crete matters reaohes only probability.68 An inferential prooess of some sort,
however, is a

.!!!l!.

qua ~ oondition of assent,69 and the strength of its argu-

mentation does have its influenoe on assent.70

The

normal state of inferenoe

is to apprehend propOSitions as notions,71 and it is most perfect when it 1s
exercised. on notions. 72

The object of the inferential process when exercised

on oonorete _tter is not truth, but rather verisimilitude or the truth-like. 73
Inference as a reasoning prooess is divided into natural, fomal, and informal inferenoe.

Formal inference is verbal reasoning) 74 verbal reasoning in

-

68Ibid., 8.
69Ibid., Ll.
7OIbid., 171.
7l~., 12, 39 ..40.

72Ibid., 40.

Newman here reters to romal inferenoe.

Again, f'omal, rather than informal or natural, inferenoe is

reterrecr-to.

14Newman

73Ibid., 157, 259.

Again, Newman refers to formal inference.

opposes verbal reasoning to mental reasoning. Natural inferenoe
and informal inference are the two t)'pes or mental reasoning. Verbal reasoning
is mental reasoning expressed as adequately as possible in words.

24
its soientifio form is logio or syllogistio reasoning.75

Newman uses the term

formal inferenoe for verbal reasoning both in its scientifio and non-soientifio

sense. 76
Verbal reasoning, although it has great utility,77 partly sucoeeds and
partly fails in providing a test and O:O."Ill1lonJ'l1t)a.sure of reasoning, as it is

meant to do. 78

It tails first of aJ.l insofar as words oannot fully expres8the

oountless varieties and subtleties of human thought.79
syllo;l1stl0 reasoning bot.h ooncern the abstract.
rive at truth. 80

SeoondJ.y, verbal and

In the abstract they can ar-

Premisses which are true in the abstraot order, however, may

7'Ibid., 26.3-264: "Verbal reasoning, of whatever kind, as opposed to mental, i'i"iliat I mean by inference, whioh differs frot'!. logio only inasmuoh as
logio is its soientifio form. And it will be more oonvenient here to use the
two words indiscriminately, for I shall say nothing about lof,.'io whioh does not
in its substance also apply to inference." cr. also p. 287: "I have assumed
throughout this section that all verbal. argumentation is ultimately syllogistic.-

761bid• A third name often given to but not wholly oommensurate with formal inferenoe is demonstration. Demonstration oonsists of a syllo;;imn made up
of two neoessary premisses whioh lead to a true conolusio~ proVided the reasoning is oorrect. Newman s.,s a syllogism is a demonstration when its premisses
"For a syllogism,is at least a demonstration, when the premisses
are granted." - ~., 29.3. ct. also Zeno, p. 76.
are granted.

77r;oid., 262,

2n.

cr. also P. 28.5: ".!Nary exercise of nature or of art 1s
It is
the great principle ot order in our thinking; it reduces a ohaos into t..amony;
it catalogues the accumulations of lmowledge; 1 t maps out tor us the relations
or its separate departments; it puts us in the way to correct its own mistakes.
It enables the independent intelleots of many, acting and re-aoting on each
other, to bring their collective force to bear upon one and the same subjectm.atter, or the same question. 11
good in its place; and the uses of this logical inference are manifold.

-

78Ibld., 261 tt.

BoIbid. , 279.
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not be applioable in the ooncrete.

NtJwtllan goes so far as to say that demon-

stration is impossible in the ooncrete order. 81

The reason for tl:ds is twofold.

b'1rst, the richness of the oonorete and individual cannot be fully expressed in
words, GSpecially if they are abstract. 82

Secondly, the ooncrete ardEll' is sub-

ject to many laws which often conf'lict with and modify eaoh other. B)

F'inally,

verbal syllogistic reasoning must assume its premisses. 54 Eaoh conolusion, &act
S",fllo~sm.,

depends upcm previous premisses which it does not prove.

This re-

gress at length arrives at first premisses or first principles which are not
admitted by all men and whioh are outSide the province of logic a.nd syllogisms

since they cannot be proved. 8S
The result, aocording to Newman, is that romal inference, when employed
on matters of' fact, oan oonolude to probabilities only, because, first of all,

j.ts conclusions are abstraot, not concrete, and seooMly, beoause its premisses are assumed, not proved.

-

.,

8J. Ibid

8.'

26"
8.3N'ewman,
82Ibid.,

Formal interenoe, therefore, of' itself does

267.

AeolotGa, p. 168, "There is great differenoe between a conolusion

in the abstract and a conclusion in the conorete, and • • • • a oonclusion may
be l'IlOd.i.fied in fact by a oonclusion trom. some opposite principle."

84wewman, Grammar,

p.

269.

8SN81IIlan of course holds that there are self-evident first principles (ct.
P. 210). Newman uses the word usume in the sense ot not being demonstrable.
Certain sel1':!!'eVident first principI'GS are not demonstrable in any order. The
premisses of a syllogism, however, are not demonstrable insofar as their demonstration would :require a regress which tends to GO back to self-evident first
principles. '
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not reach truth in the ooncrete. 06
What is yet needed is a method o.f reasoning more adapted

variety of the concrete.

to the row. tiform

Newman lists two suoh prooesses, one of which he

oalls natural inferencfJ, the other in.fomal inference.
the most ordinary mode of hum&'1 reasoning.87

Natural inference is

This method of reasoning proceeds

not from propOSition to proposition, but from things to things, from concrete

f.acts to conerete facts. B8 It usually shows itself as a. Simple act, not as a
process, as i f there were no medium coming between antecedent and consequent. 89

The transition involved is almost spontaneous and is more or less unconscious90
and implic1t. 91

The perfection and precision of this natural reasoning varies

with the PGrson.9 2

"When it is characterized by preCision, subtJ.ety" prompti"

tude, and truth, it is of

C011I'80

a gift and a rarity: in ordinary minds it is

86Ibid., 268, 278, 279, 284. Newman says on p. 278: "As I have already
said, "O'iiiinents abOut the abstract oannot handle and. determine the concrete.
They may approx1mate to a proof". but they only reach the probable, because they
cannot reach the particular. n
259-260, 330-331.
88Ibid., 330.
871bid.,

A9~.

90Ib1d., 332. cr. also: rtThe tenn funconscious' does not convey exactly the
same meaning as it does when used of the subconscious in modem psychology, but
implies the spontaneity ot activity with whioh oUZ' ren ection has not (or not
yet) occupied itself. A oonsequence 1s that the objeot thus spontaneously
eras,ped will not yield up all its riches of information immediately. "-Boekraad,
p. 141.

-

91Ibid., 331.

-.

92Ibid.,

338-339, 341-342.
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it is biassed and degraded by prejudioe, passion, and self-interest} but still,
after all, this divination oomes by nature, and belongs to all of us in a measure, to women more than to me, bitting or missing, as the case may be, but
with a succeS8 on the whole sufficient to show that there is a method in it,

thought it be implicit. rt93 Examples of this natural reasoninc are found in the
weather prediotions o£ the simple .farmer and the diagnosis ot the physician,
both of whom otten oannot assign 82plicit reasons for their conolusions .. 94
~Te1I'Ilan

calls natural inference instinctive, but he means by instinct in this

case not a natural aense raoul ty, but an almost spontaneous perception of

i'acts without assignable inferential. media. 9S
The second mode ot concrete reasoning is informal inference.

This me-

thod, according to Newman, is the most proper way to truth in the conerete.9 6

Informal inference consists in rising to a conclusion from a cumulation of probabilities which are independent

or

each other and which result from the nature

and eire_stancos of the particular case in questlon.91

The mind in such cases

is swayed by a oss of details, a body of proof, but is unequal to the complex

-

93Ibid. 3.31.
9SIbid., 33.3-3.34. cr. alsoe "There are two things then, which cauaed Newman to""QJiOose and justify the use of the word inst.inct; first a certain spontaneity of our acts, which wa per1'onn naturally and not aocording to some artifioial arrangement or rule, and secondly, the fact that theso acts are oonoernEd
wi th things, and so imply realization. IJ-J3oekraad, p. 143.

-

96Ibid., 288.

-

97Ibid.
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analysis of this proof.98

The mind, however, in viewing this cumulation of

probabilities per 11l00llJJ1 unius is ahle, depending on it,s (the mind's) perfeotion,
to discern the limit, the conclusion, toward which the probabilities converge.99

The mind then judges that the only

that the conclusion indicated is

~xfricient

reason f.or suoh a convergence is

tr~e.1OO

Infomal inference is not assent; it is, like all inferenoe, comi tional,

insofar, at least, as its conclusion is dependent on its premisses. 101 Informal. inference dif'fers from natural inference, which also is a means to truth
in concrete matters, primarily by the fact that informal inferonce is recognized as a process.

Informal inference conSists of several acts, while natural.

inference is a Simple, implicit, immediate passage from antecedents to conclu-

sian. Moreover, the element of consoiousness and explicitness is greater in
informal inference than in natural inference. 102

The description ot infoma1

inference given in this section is qui to brief since a more detaUed analysis

-

98I bid., 292, 301.

lOlIbid.,

99 Ibid. , 2£18, 321, 321.

lOOIbid., .301, 317 ff., 321, 321.

-

293.

l02Bacohus, p. ll3: n'the difference between the three ki.nds of inferences
lAY be lJUlIInarized. thus. In Iorma.l. inl'erenoe the process of reasoning which
leads up to the conclusion is axplioit or consoious. In natural inferenoe it is
inlplicit or unconsoious. In int'onaal inference it is partly the one and partly
the other." Boekraad says of informal inferenoel "'I'here are therefore two constituent parts of the process. one whioh oan be formulated in a clear way ac ..
cording to all the requirements of sound logic, the other beyond that sphere.
too subtle and too personal to be embodied in a definite formula: both have
their part to plq. "--Boelcraad, p. 41.

w:Ul be offered in chapter three.

THE ILLATIVE SENSE

l'he last tem to be explained is Newman t s famous Illative Sense.

The

Ulat:1ve Sense is the mind proceeding to truth by way of either natureJ. or informal inference.

It is that function of the mind by which it arrives at and

discerns truth in ooncrete 1I1atters..

NeWfl1&rl calls the Illative Sense the power

of judging and ooncluding in its pertection. 103 He compares it with Aristotlets Ehronesisl0 4 except that Ehronesis is limited to matters of oonduct,
while the Illative Sense operates in all concrete matters.10S The Illative
Sense uses the various inferential. p.rocesses as instruments and reaches conClusions above and beyond them.lo6

103Newman, Grammar, p. 3S3.

l04Ibid., 3S3-3S4. J. 1". Cronin says that the Illative Sanse is a combination o1"'Ar1stotJ.e·s Ehronesi~ and nous. Newman, in the Grammar, at least..
never mentions the latter term. n'!h'I'S faculty is Clearly a fUSion of Aristotle's !lOUS, or Intelligence and the phronesu, or Prudence • • • • Aristotle
says that Science (episteme) or the use Ol' logic, oannot attain to the knowledge of first principles. This is the function of the Intelligence (nou)
which intuitively grasps these truths. At the other end at the chain logiC can
not attain ooncrete tacts, the ultimate particular things. To attain these
latter 1s a function of Prudence {&ahroneaU).n_J:>hn Franci. Cronin, Card1nal
N~l !!!! Thegq; 2! Knowlade (
sh:1ngton, 193$), p. 27.
lOSIbid., )17, 354. cr. also Gordon Harper, Cardinal Ne'NlYlan and Vl1ll1_
Froud~'1"tf&ltimore, 1933), p. 203: ft'lhere is a faoulty in the dna-whIch f think
I &ive called the inductive senae, which, when properly oul. tlvated and used
answers to Aristotle's phronesia. its province being, not virtue, but the
'inquisitio veri l , which decides lor us, beyond any technical rules, When, how,
etc. to pass from inference to assent, and when and under what Circumstances,
etc., eto. not."

certain crit1csl07 relegate the Illative Sense to the order of sensation
seemingly because Newman uses the word sense.

Newman, however, uses this term

in the same way as one would say "good sense," or "common sense, tt or Ifa sense
of beauty or justioe. "108

The Illative Sense is in every way an intelleotual

funotion, as Will be seen more in detail in the following ohapters.

l07D1Aroy, P. 1511 "Our knoWledge of the external world, o£ other persons,
of oausality, oannot be made evident hy thought, but is based on some instinot
whioh it i8 a waste of tiae to try to ori tioise. ,iI"'or the same reason he (New...
man) holds that even the most severe deductive proofs end only in the probable;
and so he claims that reasoning must always be oompleted by a new factor i f it
is to pass from the probable to the oertain. It is clear that a. great strain
is put upon this illativa sense :U' it has to do so muoh • • • • To make the
valuable contribution contained in all this acceptable it is necessary first of
all to restore the prtmao;y or the intellect • • ." Fa thar D' Arcy seemingly
lUkes no distinction between deductive proofs in the abstract, and as applied
in the conorete, ct, also T. Harper, p. 545., where the Illative SenM is
called a "blind instinct. It
l08 Newm an, Grammar, p.

345.

CHAPTER III

THE CONCLUSION OF THE
ILLATIVE SENSE

110w does man arrive at truth? At oerti tude'

These important and otten

baf.1l.ing questions have for centuries stirred inquiring minds a.n.xioua for a

definite, absolute answer.

Many

solutions have been attempted, some resulting

in doctrines of innate ideas or special Ulum1nations, others in a sceptioal or

relatiVistio denial of any truth to be attained at all.
Bow does man arrive at truth?

This question exercised throughout a life-

time the powerful mind of John Henry Newman.
greatest work, the

(h-8l!1tIl&I'

.2! Assent,

Newman, however, in perhaps his

does not concern himself with abstract

truth, wblch, he holds, can in moat oases be discovered through a process of
fOl"!'!l8l inference or logical. syllogistic deduction.

Nellllllan' s problem in the

Granwar lies rather in determining bow the mind attains truth in the concrete
•

b

order where formal. inference is eithe:.r· inadequate or wholly wanting.

The solu-

tion of this problem is important, tor through it alone can Newma"1 justify the
act of assent as an unconditional adherenoe to a proposition as true.

Newman's

answer lies in the operation of the Illative Sense, that is, in the power or
the m1Dd to judge oorreotJ.y in concrete matters.

Because this thesis is studying the relation of the lllatlve Sense to the
act of assent, it is first necessary to show hoW' the mind with its lllativa
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power reaches truth which is the bans of assent.

The ma1n concern of this

third chapter, therefore, is the conclusion of the Illative Sense, why and how
and under what circumstances this conclusion

to truth is made.

For this rea-

son the insuffioient bases of assent and the operation of the Illative Sense

prior to conol uding Will be rather brtetly treated.
Truth is the object of aesent, the condition under whioh assent is
g1~1

This is a theme which Ne'IIUn repeats throughout the Grammar. 2

Every

human being, however, bas oountle8s assents which seem true and rat1anaJ..

enough, but whioh cannot be

dem.o~ted.

Moreover, these assents are not

based on perceptual evidence, wuch. a. "I.e. you" or "I hear the music."

Fi-

nally, one would bave diffioulty accounting fully for these firm affirmations

of the mind.
way

Are these assents valid?

They may be it there is at least one

to truth other than demonstration and formal interenoe.

Newman holds first

that there i8 such a way to truth, aDd secondly that in concrete matters formal.
1nf'erence is inadequate.
Formal interenoe, whioh usually prooeeds b7 w8:1' of ayllog-lsaa, is the way

to truth in the abstract, but not in the conorete.) The reason as noted in

lNewman oalls opinion which is a notional assent "an assent to a proposition, not as true, but as probably true lt --!2!2.., 58. This definition of opinicm which is repeated on p. 178 of the Gra. nmar would seem either to oonfuse
opinion v.tth inferenoe or to de1\Y that truth is the object of assent. However,
Newman's mind se8l'l'ls to be that the assent is given, not to a probability as
such,. but to the faot that such and suoh a proposition is probable is true.

2!bid., 172, 259.

-

)Ibid.,

268, 278, 279, 284.
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chapter tw:) is threa.fold. 4 Flrst, fornull inference, because it makes use of
l.J'ords, cannot fUlly 8Jepress t.he intrioate" subtle, and often implioit workings

of the human mind • .5 Secondly, fonnal inference does not prove, but assumes, ita
premisses. 6 Thirdly, formal inference concludes only to probabUity in the ooncrete, sinoe the riohness and varietJ' of the concrete and individual cannot be
wl~lly

expressed in words, espeoially if they are abstraot, and sinoe the con-

orete order is subjeot to many laws Whioh often negate of modU"y eaoh other. 7

l;'or these reasons, since it does not oonduot to truth" fornal. inference ls not
the suffioient oause of assent in oOIlOi-'e'te matters.
Newman does not rejeot formal ini'ercnoe; rather he moves «way from it.
The reason for this Withdrawal from formal Werenoe and syUogistiC reasoning
is found in their limitation.

1'be fillet that formal Werenoe is greatly re-

stricted in its application is

~rtant

for an appreciation of Newmants doc-

trine of concrete reasoning or Worm&! inferenoe.
summarized into three points.

Newman's position oan be

First, reason orders one to assent only when

truth or absolute proof has been reaohed. 8 Seoondly, a perfeotly logical de

4

monstrat1on oan command assent.. Fomal inference, therefore, when it is able to

4er.

PP. 24... 2.5 in ohapter two

or

this thesis •

...

;"1Ne'Nlllarl, Grammar, pp. 264.. 284.

--

~id., 269.
7Ibid., 265, 267, 289
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arrive at truth in the abstraot, oan oomm&ld assent.9

Thirdly, except in cer-

tain limited cases, there is no perfect logioal demonstration.

ttI consider

there is no suoh thing as a peri'oct lO;Jioal demonstration; there is always a

margin of objeotion even in

~1atherlUltics,

except in the cue of short proofs, as

the propOSitions of Euolid. ttlO
Two oonolusions follow from these three points.

The first conclusion is

that one oannot devise a sCienoe of reasoning, which, if followed" is suffi...
oient to oample assent in ooncrete matters. ll

1o~io and s.yllogistio reA~on1ng

are not able to determine every trnth; n~eir range is in fact sm.all. 12

It 1s

rather "the mind that reasons, and that controls its own reasonings, not any
teohnioal apparatus of wards and pr~ryo9itions.uIJ

The mind with its illative

power goes so far as to reaoh oonclUSions which are above and beyond its premisses.

The seoond oonclusion is that the range of conorete matter and conorete

reasoning is very large.

Newman extends the province

or

concrete matter and

concrete reasoning to investigations in chemiStry, law, morals, religion, experimental so1ence, literary or;i.tioism, historical research, theology, and the

9Ibid., 170. - "1 allow then as much as thiS, that, when an arguement 1s in
itself''''''iUd by itself oonclusi~"e
a truth. it ClAS by a law of our nature the

or

same command ()Vel" our assent, or rather the truth whioh it has reached has the
same command. as our senses ha.ve. II
lOLva.rd, pp. 240.

cr. also r~el-lman, Grammar, Pp. l70, 410.

llN'ewman, qranma;r, p. 350.

-

12Ibid., 358.
1.3Ib1d., 353.

greater part of mathematlcs. l 4 He 8~S of the operation

or the

Illative Sense

that "it is often oalled the 'judicium prudent1. viti,' a standard of certitude
which olds good in all concrete matter, not only in those cues of practioe and
duty, in whioh we are more famUiar With it, but in questions of truth and
falsehood generally, or in what are oalled

t

speculative- questions, and that,

not indeed to the exclUSion, but as the 8).lpplenaent of logic. ral.$ ,(') short, Newman includes almost the whole f.d thought and reasoning within the orbit of con-

crete matter, with the result that hardlY' any of onets reasoning proceeds by
way of fomal inference and

de~natratlon.

Before proceeding fram fozmal inference to the valid way to truth in concrete matters, one other insu!tioient basiS

or

assent shoUld be oonsidered.

This second inadequate basis of aasent 1s vividness of apprellension. 16 Assents,
f.d course, can be made Without sufficient reason, and vividnes. of apprehension
is a oommon trap for assent in OOllCl"8W matter.

But the strength and clarity

of a mental. apprehenSion is no argument for the reality of the object wh:1oh the
1mpreaslon represents.

Newman cites Hume and his school, wi. th their rejection

of miracles, as an example of this tallacy.

These phUosophers were so strong-

ly impressed by the uniformity at nature that they judged it to be inViolable.17

Newman does not deny the inn uence of a viV'id real apprehenSion over one t s acts

-

14Ibld., 359.

-

15Ibid., 317.

-

16Ib1d ., 80 ft., 185.

-

l7Ibid ., 81.
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of assent.

This inf'lux, however, 1s accidental, the trJ.8 effect of a strong

real apprehension being "not to create assent, but to intensify it. ulB
Since formal inferenoe and vividness

or

apprehenSion are insufficient to

cause assent because they do not reach truth in ooncrete, contingent matters,
the question as to what is the adequate basiS of assent must be asked.

tainly, truth 1s the only adequate basia, but how is truth come by?

eer-.

N8wmaD

solves this problem with his mative Senae which prooeeds to truth primarily
by means of :i.ntormal interence.19

Let it be noted that informal i.nferenoe i8 but a method used by the mind
With its Ulative power, and since it is inference, it too 1s oonditioned just
as formal inference is.

An inferenoe may be conditioned for two reasons.

First, the conclusion of any inference, formal, informal, or natural, is dependent on its premisse., and this dependenoe is neoessarily included in the
oonclusion.

Thi. is true of inference even when the mind in using it arriyea

at truth. 20

The oonclusion _,. be true; but it is held to be true only insofar

as it pJ:t>Ceeds trom its pre1llisaes...
itseJ.i" {as in the act of

assen~)J

That is, it is not as yet held as true in

it is as yet conditioned by its premisses.

Secondly, in concrete matter, f omal. 1n!erence does not reach truth, but only
probability.

This however, does not hold true of informal. inference which is

not thus conditioned, but which may lead to truth in the ooncrete.

Finally,

19m8 is not to exclude natural inference as a method for attaining truth
Informal Werenoe is but a prolongation o.r extension or natural inferenoe which is less explicit and le8s oonsoious.

in the concrete.

-

2OIbid., 203.
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informal inference does not supercede lO>iic and formal. inference; it merely
carries them into the conorete.

How this is done w1ll be shown throughout this

third chapter.
How does the Illative Sense proceed in its use of informal inferenoe'l

The Ulative Sense begins the quest for truth with a problem to be solved.

In

the investigation of this problem, it must first judge whioh prinoiples are

to

be used, and whioh are to be lett aside, whioh prinoiples may be ass'lJl'!Ied, and

whioh must be proved, whioh mu.st be avoided as false and so forth.21

Newman

treats oJ: these first prinoit;las on Which the Illative Sense must pass judgment
in his disoussion ot pres'W'Ilption, a tJ'Pe of notional assent.

Pres1l.1.1!Ptlon is in

fact assent to first prinoiples. 22
Newman defines a first principle as "the propositions with whioh we start
in reasoning on any given subject-matter. 1t23

The existence, tor exa,-nple, of an

external world, of oonsoienoe, of causality, of

OI'CiC!'

in the universe, of a

right and wrong, are instances which Newman gives of first principles.

These

first principles are notional beeaue they are expressed in general, abstract
propoSitions such as Itthere is ,a right and wrongl' or "a world external to my-self' exists. tt

They do, however, have their origin in an experience or a mul ti-

-

2l Ib1d., 371, 37$-376.
22!2!2._ , 60.
2)Ibid. ct. also John Henry Newman, Lectures on the Present Position of
C&tholI'081n Engl,and (London, 1918), p. 284: iiI jUitliOw said that tbese 'irst PrinCTples, being a man'. elenaentary points ot thinking, and the ideas
which he bas prior to other ideas, might be considered as almost part of' his
mind or moral. being 1 tsel.t" • "

)8

tude of experiences. 24 Newman divi.des first principles into two types, those
"which resolve themsel vee into the condi tiona o.t human nature, .. 2" which proceed
either from nature or are according to the natural use of one's faculties, and
those whioh have their beginning in "the sentiments of the age, oountry, reli-

gion, Social habits and ideas. tl26 That there is a right and wrong is an example

or

the former, that Jesuits are 81y and orafty o£ the latter, at least, tor

many Protestants.

As oan be seen, those first prinoiples which reSUlt trom

culture and environment aocount to a great degree for the diversity of opinion
and thought _ong

un.

After its choice 01: first principles, the Illative Sense must proceed to
truth through a process of reasoning or inference.

This conquest of t.rutb is

moat important for this theSis since it indicates the primary and directly
prox:lmate relation of the Ulative Sense to assent.

By means of this advance

to truth, the oonditionality which hampers tor.taal. interenoe is done away With,
tor when truth is found probabUity disappears, and furthermore, there is no
longer any need of a dependence upon premisses.

The operation of the nlative

Sense in this process mq be cOl'lVeniently divided into three parts.

First, the

Ulative Sense cumulates a number of probable argum.ents.

Seoondly, it knows

these probable arguments not one by one, but as a whole.

Thirdly, the illative

Sense discerns the leg! timate conclUSion of these probabUities.

24 cr• Newman, Present P08iti~ PP. 283-284, where Newman seems to equate
first principles with real apprerUJ10n and real assent. Al though first principles are notional. in the Grammar. Newman does not deny the powerful influence
of real apprehension and real. assent in one's thought and action.
2"Newman, Grammar, P. 270.

-

26Ibid•

Truth is oomplex and many-sided, depending for its resolution on the oombination of a nUmber of varied, scattered eVidenoes.
proach to truth partakes of this cClilPleXity.

Consequently, the ap-

If one were to attempt the oon-

version of a Protestant with the simple, tlesbless syllogism, "Protestants are
bound in oonsoienoe to join the Catholio Church; but you are a Protestant;

therefore • • • J" he would soon rea1.iu the futUity of suoh an unrealistio. me-

thad.

Truth, at least in conorete, contingent oircumstances, is not attained

by taoU. reasoning and bald syll.ogisms.

The nu.mber of possible distinctions

which the beleaguered Protestant could make as regards both major and minor are

a1.most countless.

-

Newman lists sene of the. more prominent ones in the

.!k!l!l-

mar. 27
'rbe method used by the mind or Illative Sense in resolving such an argu-

ment as "Protestants are bound to join the Catholic Church" is far mor-e subtle
and delicate than formal inference or any syllcglsm..

calls this method informal. Werence.

Newman, as has been seen,

The special characteristio of informal.

inf'erenoe i8 to rise to truth and anent frOM a oumulation ot probabUities, 28

that i8, from a multitude of
answer, although none of them

l~ttle
~n

indications, all of which point toward an
Singly, nor all of them. together, is alone

strong encugh to foroe a oertain oonclusion.
Newman follows and improves on the teaohing of two theologians in this

matter ot accumulating probabUi tiGsJ the first is Bishop Butlel', an Anglican

-

27Ib1d., 289-290
28 Ibid ., 288. ItIt is the cumulation ot probabilities, indepe::1dent of each
other, -arIsing out of the nature and circumstanoes of the particular oase whioh
i8 under reviewJ probabUities too tine to avail separately, too subtle and cirouitous to be convertible into syllogisms, too numerous and various tor such
'\on. even were theY' O1UVV'" Ihi. "

divine, the second a Qltholio theologian named Amort.

Bishop Butler taught

that a number of probable evidences. could lead to a high probability, to a
probability suffioient to be called a praotical oertitude and oompelling
enough to justify action.29

tlewman agrees With Butler insofar as he also be....

~:;ins With a. multitude o:t probab1.e evidences;30 he difters With Butler, however,

because he holds that under certain oondi tiona suoh an aooumulation

or

probable

arguments oan lead, not only to high pmbability, but to truth and the consequent mental acts ot assent and certitude.

Amort, on the other hand, held that a proof suffioient tor assent and
oertitude oould be oonstruoted trom one argument o:t greater probability.31

In

this way, he attempted to prove the claims of catholioism over Protestantism.
Newman does not explioi tly delQ" this position, but requires :rather a number ot
probable arguments, not just one of greater probability.

This aooumulation of probabilities trom

~ch

the Illative Sense rises to

truth and asMnt 1s not a mere oongeries of probabilities, as Father l1art1n
DtAl"OY seems to think.32

A oo:ngeri.es

ot probable evidenoes is a number of pro-

29Evidenoes or arguments which at'e termed probable derive this nane from
their relation to the oonclusion whioh the illative Sense ultimately reaches.
They are not of neoessity probabltJ insofar as there is S()l1le doubt as -1',0 their
existence or intrinsic content. .E;ach probable evidenoe may be a fact in itself.

JOJ. Hobinson, "Newman's Use of Butler's Arguments, If The Downside Review.
LXXV'I (Spring 1958), 167.
nNe_an, Grammar. P. 4ll.
32DfArcy, P. 201. "r do not believe that the probabUities as sueh ea."l ever
make certitude, whereas there seems to be no doubt tha.t evidence ea."1 so acoumulate and cohere together as to :reveal inevitably a oertain pattern and meaning."
Father D'Areyts "oorreotive" pOSition seems to be almost the same as lJewman's,
although phrased in dUterent terms.

bable evidences considered together, taken as a group.

No amount of' evidence

of this sort, however# can of itself lead to truth and assent.

Newman would

fully agree with this; he makes a distinotion in the AEologj.a which indicates

support.

"!'loreover, that as there ware probabUities whioh suftioed for cer-

titude, so there were other probabilities which were legitimately adapted to

create opinion. ,.33 Newman's teaching is, not that probable arguments are
themselves ever sutfioient for truth, but that

8.

or

number o£ probable arguments

plus a third element, that is, a mind able to discern the connection and interrelationships and direction of. these evidenoes and recognize their convergence
to one point, oan lead one to truth. 34
A further indication of this J.1ne of reasoning is given in

treatment of informal inference in the Jrammar.

In this section,

l~e'Wn1an t

s

r:~eWi1Wlquotes

Bishop Butler as sqing that probable proofs when added together not only in-

crease the evidence but multiply it..3$ If tr\'.th were to be the result of pr~...
babilities as such, then four probable proof's would be only tour times as probable as one.

addition.

The increase would be purely arithmetical and on the level. ot

The fact, however,

~t

the evidence is niul tiplied indicates that

there 1s present an acti va in telligence which is able to analyze and intexpret

its evidence.

This intelli:;ence or Illative Sense realizes that !tas the ert...

Cloudy weather is evidence 'I#ha:~ rain Will proThe statement that rain will come, however, is but an opinion,
unless one can aotually foretell the future.
3.3wewman" Afologj,a, p. 21.

bably come.

34PhiliP F:lanagan, Newman,
p. 101.
35Newman, ()rammar, p• .319.

.F'ai~.!!l2 ~ Believer (~J~stm.insterJ 1946),

dance increases it becomes more
the truth of the conclusion.
il1Creased to such

a.'ld

And corti tude is reaohed when the evidence has

apoint that no alternative explanation seems possiole. tl36

The Illative Sense, l'~ewm.an

guments, not one by on., but in
the whole case. ,,37

More d1ffiaul t to explain otherwise than by

says, knows this accumulation of' probable ar-

til.

single glali.o8, "by a. mental comprehension of

In this Newman Wishes to emphasize t.he spontaneity and fa ..

oili\y of action of the illative Sense whioh in much of its reasoning almost
takes i tseli from out the order of t.imo.

In the no.mal prooess of thought, one

moves rapidly from oonsiderations to conclusion.

The mind does not have nor

take the tinle to examine each evidence explicitly and individually.

One grasps,

as it were, "the full tale ot premisses and the oonclusion per modum unius. 1I38
Ii'inally, the illative Sense d1eoerns the legitimate concluSion towards

which the probable eVidence points.

This is what Newman means by

'hlle illative Sense discerns the convergence of the probabilities.

oemment of

til.

wa~r1ng

that

This dis-.

oonclusion 1s preceded by a dialeotic in whioh the illative Sense

examines and weighs its evidence.

In this process of reasoning, the Illative

Sense overcomes objeotions, neutralizes adverse theories, gradually clears up

dLffloulties, discovers new oorrelations, and finally comes to a conolusion.J9
Uewman desoribes this act of ooncluding in many plaoes.

36Flanagan, P. 101 •
.31Newman, Grannar, P. 291.

-

38 rOid., 301.
39Ibid., 321.

da says that the

lllative SaMe in grasping and cOOIprehending the premisses, dilllCerns thelr up-

shot,bO or peroeives the legittmate conclusion in and through the preM!sses,41
or reaches a conclusion above and beyond th&Prob~bl.e evidence.. h2 or recognises

that the concluSion indicated 18 not only probable but true,43 or determines
the 11tnit of oonverging probal:d.llt1es an-'

;:,il';

reasons .utticient tor a proo1'.bh

The oonclusion, therefore, 111 a reaul t not only of the avaUable evidence,
but clso of the lIdnd or IUativeSense which anaJ.yzes and interprets that evi-

denCe and is led to look be70nd it to a point whioh the eVidence can indicate

but which it of ltaelt oannot logLo&U7 reaoh.

The

eVidenoe presenw a lIlulti-

tude of indications whioh converge toward one answer or conclusion, althou&h
none of the.. probable evidences alone, nor aU
conclusion, ,Father

b.r

D'Arc,.,

80

them

together,

ca.nf~. the

in his attempt to correct Newman, actually ends' up

umdtt1.ngly stating 'the same teaching.

et'idenoe can

or

"there 8e_. to be no doubt that

aocumulate and cohere together as to reveal inevitably a

~...

tain pattern and meaning. ,,16

-

Jt)Ibld., 291.

blIb1d., 301.

42Ibid., 316.
blIb14., 320.

"Ibid.,

-

360~

!sSn'Aroy,p, 2Ol.. 'ather D'Arc,.'. poIJitlon doe. agree W1th Newmu'a it
this coherence of evidence 18 the result of the heal thy action of the mind. It
the ooherence, however, resul ta l'rom the evidence alone, then the two pOSitions
differ.

44
The proof in such an inference from. an accumulation of probable evidences

is indirect.

The eVidence supplied, sinoe it is made up of probabUit1es, does

not logioally touch the conclusion, which 1s rather above and beyond the evi-

-

"The conolusion, tt theraf'ore, "in a real or ooncrete question is fore-

dence.

.!!!!!.

and predicted rather than actually attained; foreseen in the number and

direction of acoumulated premiSses, whioh all converge to it, and as the resul t
of their combination, approach it more nearly than any assignable difference,

yet do not touch it logioally (though only not touching it,) on aocount of the

nature

or

its subject-matter, and the delicate and l.!;1plioit oharacter of at

least part of the reasonings on whioh it depends. n 46
Newman oompares this indirectness of proof vi th the l8lm'l1& With widen
Newton begins his PrinciPia. 47 A regular polygon, he says, whioh is inscribed
within a Circle, if its sides are continually diminished, tends to become that
cirole, although it vanishes before there is a perfect coincidence.

The ten-

dency therefore of this polygon never extends beyond the stage of tendenoy.

So

too the probable endences oonverge or tend toward a oonclusion, but never ot
themsel. ves pass beyond this

te~eno;y.

Because the proof in such oases is inclirect, the concl.uding judgfllent must

also be indirect and in a HMe, negative.

'!'he Illative Sense does not direct-

ly judge the oonclusion to be true, but says rather that it cannot be otherwise.

"We are considered to feel, ra.ther th&"'l to see, its oogency, and we deCide, not

that the oonclusion must bo, but that it cannot be otherwise.

46wewman, Gramm."

-

41Ibid., 320.

p. 321.

The underlined words are mine.

We say, that we

do not see our way to doubt it, that it is impossible to doubt, that we are
bound to believe it, tha t we should be idiots, if we did not believe. 1'f48 Newman

t"~sewhere

says that the IUative Sense reoognizes that the oonclusion 1s

inevitable, that it is as good as proved, that it is as undeniable as i t it
were proved, that one would act irrationally if he were not to accept the conclUSion as proved.~
The principle involved in snch an indirect judgment seems to involve the
principle of sufficient reason.

Thus the only sufficient reason for the con-

vergence of probable arguments is that the conclusion which they indicate is
objectively true.

The convergence which the U1ative Sense recognizes would be

irua:plioable unleas the conclusion toward which the oonvergence points was the
legi tima te lim! t of the process.
To conclude from this indirectness of judgment, however, that the assent
or oertitude given to the conclusion of an inf'ormal inference is of the purely
practiCal. order is invalid.

Suoh is not NelmlAn's mind. 50 The tem Rra.ct!:caJ.

certitude is usually used to designate a probability sufficient for action.
Newnw.n does not mean this

or

.1n~

the &ssent vi th which one acoepts the conclusion

an accumulation of oonverging probabilities is absolute, and given, at least

indirectly" to truth.

To attaoh this false interpretation to Newman.! s thought

destroys the whole ratio of his work on assent, since it forces hilIl to hold

48Ibid., 317.,

-

L9 Ibid., 321, 323.
SoIbid., .325-.326.

Cf., also Boekraad, p. 287.

46
almost the sane position as Jolm Locke, Bishop ::3utler, and the rationaliets. Sl
Newman uses the word moral t..o desoribe the evidence and assent or oertitwie Given to the oonolusion Gt an inforl'llal. inference.

is moral evidenoe.

One has moral. certitude.

The evidence presented

Newnan dislikes the term moral

beoa.use of i,ts vagueness, although he himself uses the word in a
fusing manner.

va":;'U(1

and con-

Newman's definition of moru, however, does not seem to aocord

wi th the one whioh Father Harpel" gives it in his interpretation of the (ll'anmuu::'.

Harper says the evidence and the consequent assent and certitude are moral. because they are based on human testimony, "upon the .tree-will of

!11a,n.

Who can

lie or speak the truth, as he plaases. n$2
Newman does rely upon human testimony, on the witness of others, but his
use of the term moral. relates rather to the person who i. investigating and
attempting a oonolusion.
erce assent.
JIfIlIft

The evidence is not absolute. it oannot compel or

00-

The person, therefore, with the best use of his mat1Y'e Sense,

bridge the gap between eV'idenoe and conclusion before he can give assent.

In su.ch a prooess, as shall be saen later, the person acts under a sense of

outy and in accordance

Wi th o(}~cience.

Newman, then, uses the term moral be-

cause duty and oonscience are involved.
?hoae who object to Newman's teaohing on informal inference and oonverging
probabilities on the grounds that they are Ulogioal and U!l-1I1etaphysical must
ul timately face Newman f s own personal e:xperlence.

51Gf'. pp. $-8 in chapter one

In the

~ol0tP-a

where he

o:l this thesis.

$2Thomas Harper, "Dr. Newman's Essay on the Grammar or Assent," The Month,
XIn (July 1870), 46.

h7
describes his gradual conrersion to Catholicism, !·lewrnan makes it clear that it

was not syllogisms or romal inference which led him on.

Re constantly

iterates in spirit i t not in W3rds t.'1e ma.x::i..m of St. Ambrose:
c~lacuit

B!2. salvum

facere

~geuliJm.!2.:!!*

!!2!! .ll ...d,;;;;i...a1...EI.. ,c. .,t. .,i....o,;;;;a

It 1s not God's pleasure to bring

His people to salvation through. arguments, through syllo:];ism.s,
fic evidences.

1'....

thr?~;~h

scienti..

flFor myself, it was not logio that carried me onJ as well might

one say that the qu1.cksUver in the baroMeter changes the weather.

It i:.; the

aOllCl'ete being that reasons; pass a number 01.' years, and I find my rrd.nd in III

new place; how? the whole man moves; paper logic is but the record ot it.

All

the logic in the world would not p..&ve made me move faster towards Home than I

did • • • • Great acts take ttme~nS3
Further on in the Apolo&ia, !'fet!llan explicitly states the grounds of his
beliet.

In 1843 and 16h4, he says that he "believed in a (bd on a ground o£

probabUity', that I believed in Christianity on a probabUity, and that I believad in Cathol1oiSr.1 on a probabU1ty, and that these three grounds of probabUity, distinct from each other otaouTSe in subject matter, were still all of

them one and the same in nat~ of' proof', as being probabUlties. "54 These

S3Newm&n, Apolol)ia, pp. 169-170. cr. also Grammart pp. 9~5f "Life is not
long enough :£or a relIgion of WerencesJ we shall never have done beginning, it
we detemine to begin with proof'. We shall ever be laying our foundations .. • •
LU'e is for action. If we insist on proofs tor every thing, we shall never
oome to action: to act you must assume, and that assumption is faith. fl ~lewman
originally wrote these words in 1841.. In introduoing them, he 1mp.lles that the
thought and eJq>r8ssion oontained therein are not necessarUy the same on all
points as his thought in 1870. Cf. pp. 91"'92

~id., 199. Ct'. also following page where Newman says: "But, let it be
obse
, that I am stating a matter of fact, not defending it; and i f any Catholic s~. in consequence tbat I have been oonverted in a. wrong way, I oan not
help that now."
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probabilities ware however of a spocial kind; thoy were ounulative, leadine to
a conclusion higher than the 10£.,:,10& ev"idenoe.

Newman gives exa'nplas of these

evinanoes for Christianity and Gatholicism in the tenth ohapter of the Grammar

whore he develops his personal reasons for belief.

First, he saYSt the history

of the ,Jewish people, especially t,11e11' history after tho Cruo1fix:ion,

pli.cal)le unless Christianity has

O()1l10

~_s

as a fulfillment ot the Old Law.

inexSecond-

ly, the heroiC sutferin:;s and deaths of the many Christian nartyrs of prhd. tive
t~~es

bear overwhelming witness to the divinity of the Christian Church.
The mative Sense, there.fore, rises frO:."tl a cumulation of probable e1'1-

dences to a true conclusion.
and in others' e:xperience..
correctly?

This is verified, Newman says, both in his own
But }'!..o'H il30ne to know whether or not he has judged

Pow 1s one to know whether or not he has arrived a.t truth?

New-

mants answer is at first startling; and seems to roveal an overlY' subjeotive

element in his thought.
ma~

ffe

s~s

that one must flconfess that there is no ulti-

test of truth besides the testimony born (sio) to truth by the mind

itself •• 55 Later he wr1 tea that. !lin no class of oonorete reason1n;s, 'hllether
in experimental Science, h1stox:toal research, or theology, is there

~

ultimate

test of truth and error in our inferences besides the trustworthiness of the

mative Sense. ,,56 rt might be arguS:d at this point that Ne1IIman nerlects objective evidence, that he must ultimately assert tbat truth is relative tor each
one or, at the other extreme, bestow the gift of infallibility on the human
J.

"Newman, Gram.ar, p. 350.

-

S6 Ibid., 359.
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mind.51

If the latter is true,

lu.lH

is error and falsehood possible?

Suoh objeotions, however.. :ffJ.sify N'ewmants position.

'!'hat Newman does

not deny objeotive evidenoe orasser-t thut truth is relative \lUl be Clonse-

quently shown. 58
hle. 59

NeltheI' does he c?nsider the Illative Sense to be infalli-

\','hat he does affirm is that the final judg!:aent on the value or objec...

tive evidence lies with each individual Illative Sense.

Objective, external

evidence is tho fundamental test and criterion for truth, lfhich is the I.il.Gaquation of mind

totbin~

or objeot.

newMan would agree to thiS, but

}~u1d

allo

assart that this criterion of objectivity must be used by the individual mind.
It is the nlativ8 Sensa, and not

8:1l

external science of reasoning, that reoog-

niles truth, the correspondence between tll1ni and concept, andoammands assent/)()

Newman's point, which 1s much 11ke that made by St. Thomas, is that the

nt1nd with its Ulat:1ve power

knOir.l

lmows when it has found truth.

elude nor assent.

that. :1 ts object is truth, and, furthermore,

Othenrise the nlative Sense could neither eon--

The Illative Sel"!.so can,

or

course, be

wron~

a.."'ld fall

into

error, but even in such erroneous juo['i.'llents the mind bears witness tc! the truth,

to what it mistakenly judges to be true.

It the test of truth were not ult:1-

mately subjective, error would b9 impossible.

It is because the illative Sense

can be wrong in its judgment that one is able to consider true what 1.s·in taot

S7For this latter interpretation s" T. Harper, "Dr.
SeNe_an, Grammar, PP. 356, 375.

59 Ibid., 224-221.
6OIbicl., 312, lh4..34S, 3$3, 358.

Newmants .tii8aay, tt

p.40.

fal ••• 61

Here, howeYer, t.he quest10u arises why eveJ70M does not arrive at the

same truth or oonclude the __ wtr:r.

For, if' truth 18 objective, and. the

ma-

tive Sense lmowawhenlt has arrived at truth, how is divergenoe in thought and

opinion possible?
stances or

In answer to these difficulties, something of the circum-

c~nditio1'lS

under whi.ch the conclusion to truth is made mutt be given.

JetllUm'S position is that the Illative Sense in its operation and quest lor

truth is conditionea by the man as be is in the concrete.
Newman stl'ongly insists on tb:1s personal. element in reasoning.o2

He free-

ly admits the two men v1ll. often judge differently' and oome to opposite conolu-

s1ons. 6)

Hence the oumulation of pl"ObabUities in nwnber and in valuo varies

aceord.1ng to the particular intellect involved. 64 Again, the power

the l1mi t ot conftrgence differs.

to discern

l'!bere one man might oonclude to truth, a

seoond will conclude to high pl"Obab:U1t.y.

Even the particular field or area in

whioh the Ulativ. S4mse e.xeela varies from man to man.

One man ha.a a peculiar

talent. for mathematics, another tor history, a third lor character analysis.
"No one would for a moment expe:ct that beoause Ne..-ton and Napoleon bo·t.h h.ad a

goni111S for ratiocination. that, in oOftsequence, Napoleon could have generalised
the principle of

thouHnd

r.!811

gran tattoo. or t:ewton have seen how to conoentrate a hundred.

at A.usterlitz.

'roo

ra:Uocinative ra.cult;.r. then. a.s found in ind1-

61Planagan, p. l06.

62

.

,..c

Newman.. ~ Pp. 279, 2-)3, 302, .JV;1, )l2, 3l7, 320,
312, and pas.1m .
bout earlier aeotiou 01 the Qramar.

6lIb1d., .302.

6b~., 293.

Viduals, is not a general inst.rument of knoWledge, but has its province, or is
what. may be called depart.aental. ,,65
Finally, men differ not onl.y in regard to conclusions reached, but also

in regard to first principles, those basic positions Wi tb wbich one begins his

reasoning at any given t1lle. 66 line result is, &s Newman says, that each man
looks at the world in his own way• .o1

what then happens to the objectivity of

tnt.h, upecially since the Ill.&'tive Sense is 1ts ultimate test'!

Again 18 not

the Ulati" Sense too subjeot.1vel
Ne1IIWl shows in many places in 'the Grammar

that tne m&ti" Sense of

each person i8 influenced not oDl,y by bis intellectual perfeo'iion, out also by
his moral perfect1on, t'reedom fronl prejudice, and 80 fort.h.
i.8 objective and absolute.

.!.loVell so, it nsues

'I'ruth 101' Newman

a secondary aspect oJ:' "latin-

toy 11:'om each onets intelleotua.l. and moral. being into wbioh it is talcen.

One

does, of oourse, examine objeotive eT..i.dence when he oomes to a conolusion or
solution.

But the influence and eol.or,

80

to speak, o£ tJri... evidence to a

large degree depends on one' 8 previous st.at.. o£ mind, on his obaraoter and in'"

The Illative Sense oJ: tbe Ol"Ciinal'1 person is biaMd and degraded by pa....
sion and prejudice, b7 lack of tl'aining and disoipline.

Yet this Ulative

-

G6 Ib1d., 269.

67r01d., 313. "The aspeo~ under whioh we view things 1& often intensely

perso~nqt even awfully so, considering that, from the nature of the oaee,
it does not. bring hale its icU.oaynorasy either to ourae.lve. or to otbira. Each
of WI look8 at. tbe world in bis own way, and doe. not. know that perhaps 1t 1s
Oharact.ar18tio~y

bis own.-

power 18 capa1U.e of perteotion.

i'r&Otioe, experienoe, and mental disoipline

taah10n the Dl1n.d.ao that its Jucl.penta beoo.tne more unerring and more perfect. 66
Lack of upertenoe, on the other hand, ls the reason for distrust of
are theoreticians only.

lltEm

who

Who WGuJ.d consult a doctor or dentist who, perfect in

theory, was lacking in eJQ>artenoel

1"01' these. reasons, liell'ltan insists that a

spEIC1&l prepariltion of the mind 1s Moeauary for the i'ruiti'u,l operation oJ: the

D.lati,.ve Sense. 69
But what can be said

conoe~ning

moral d:Ui'1oulti8•• oonoerning passion,

or prejudice. or sell'...1nteresttthut moral fault. oan obstruct the att.&iaent

of truth is beyond doubt. 70 ior e~le. :;)ne will DOt recognize that tJle ~...
t,llOllc Church i8 t.he true Church o:rGoc.:i beQ&\l.Se re!or.n of lU'a 18 dU'iiault..

Or,
"

&\ YOUIlg

man will not :t:-eoognize his true vocation because o! a disJ.ilce of it.

.1

66Ib1d., 278, 305-306, 341-342, 3$9.
69Ibid., 1al.4-lalS. Newaan luts the followin"{ a8 one way of

effeetlng this
apeciaI'Preparat1on of. JIIiDd: flIn8tead of truat1ng logical sequence, we must
trust persons, namely, those who by long acquaintance With their f.mbj~et have a
right to judge. And i f ve wiSh O1.U"8elftS to sbare in their oorwictiou and the
grounda of theml, we 1W8t folloW their history, and learn as they have leAl."ned.
We IIUri talce up their part:1cul4l" subject as they took :1 t up, beginning at tM
be~nn1ft~, give ouraelvea to it, depeJ\d on praotioe and experience more than on
reuuniBg, &DId thu· gain that mental inSight into truth, whateYer 1 ... subject.-

matter may 'be.. wb:l.ob our maatere have gained before ua"-.!2!!!., 341"3}J2.
70John BeIU7 Newaan, "The World and Sin, tI Fa1tb and Presiudioe and Other Un~UlU',I4;Id 3el;'JllOWl gl ~!A ~ (io York, 19)6hP. -. ii& worIa '18 Tu'll
~ ;;;:;a:1ng a;; deliate, and nGi\iiiieasona1U.7J beoause when the heart is wrong,
the reason goeu wrong too, and wherl wan oorrupt tbemaelves and lead bad liftS,
t.hfin they do not see the tnttn. but bave to hunt after it, and this creates a
great contuaion. u ct,. also a oonteDlpor&1"7 philosopher t 8 opinion. tli'orJ even 11'
kDoWledge i8 autonomou, oonsidered both in 1taelJ' and in regard '- what it presents, yet .tbe capacity 01' knOWjJ~ depend8 largely upon the general atti:i;wie of
the per80D that )mow. Deteoti" general atUtucla are very apt to close the .
intellectual 8;ye and to daI'keD i:t;,s v.i..ls100.; the right attitwl., on the convar.Y..
coatera s1ght"-DietriOb Von H1lC'letmmd., "catholioi_ and Unprejudicecl Knowled!;,"e, It ~ !!! T~ !! BatS (New York, .... 953), p. 1.32.

As to prejudice, Ne1fI'I&&n cite. the cue of the Dominicans, who, as he says, op-

posed the Copernioan system in pl'q'sios even

&8

late .. the latter part c4 the

nineteenth oent~¥.71

taigne was an aron..8oeptic who 1iook: great delight in his scepticism.

l'his atU-

tude ange.redthe more intense, trut.b-aeeking Pa.scal. and oalled forth from him a

severe condermation.

dual1

l~

Why do UD like Paoal and Monta1gne differ so vastly?

st.rollgl.y oppose. t.hi,.sre.Lati via.

His oonclU8i.on is "that tru.th

there is, and. attainable it ia, but that its ray-s 8t.ream in upon us through the

Dledi.Wl 01.' our moral &8 well as ow'i.ntellectwaJ. beiDgJ and that in CQD8equ.enoe

that peroeption of ita .fi.rat

pri~es

whioh 18 natural. to us i.8 en.:feebltld., ob-

structed, perverted, bY' all~ts of aeDBe and the supremacy oi eelt, aDd, on

the othel:' hand, quiokened b7 &8p;L.ratious alter the supernatural. n 72

for truth, wUl graduallyahed.
charaoter, and With d1verse

u.aJ.J.J.

error.

bao~grow:aQ.,

'i'hat is wby men o! entirely di£.t'erent

will end UP. :i.nt,eUeo'iua.l.l7 and SPirtt.-

1..'1\ the aame plaoe, for ex&!'Iiple, in the Catholio Churoh.

It is not

80

much wbe...... man begiDa that deteI'1'llinea his tinal intelleotual and spiritual.
tlOli4e, i.iut rather the q\1&lJ.t,. and streng"til of his b.oauty. ud love for t,ntt.b.

7l ward. P.2!8.
721>fe1aan. Gr&i1lHr. p. lU. on the !oJ.J.ow~ page. IJ61fJl&Il sharply sums up
Montaigne 1ft II ra;;;r Puoalla:r1. llIiInl!I.ers "MontaJ.gne wu endowed with a good estate, heal t.h, le.i.aun. lind. all', easy t.Einper, 11t.erar,y tut.es. and a auf.fio1enoy oi
booka. he could aftord thus to play With lite, and the abysses into Wbioh 1 t

-

leads us B--Ibid., )12.
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This intellectual honesty and openness, how....r, is in no

11&,. consonant

with

the attitude wh1ch passively waits for truth, wbtoh expects truth to do the

aeeld.ng.1J Truth must be actively SOUght, the atta1.nment of truth in many
cas•• partakes of the nature of
be attained by the honest mind.

IlL

conquest.

Nevertheless, truth can and w1ll

That ia wh7 Newman does not Wish to begin the

_arch tor trutb by doubting evemhlng.14
This third ohapter bas shown how the mattve Sen.. oonclude. to truth.
In this conolusion to truth, the two conditions whicb may l1m.1t an inference axe
both removed.

Probability and dependence upon premis..s are don. away with

when truth is attained.
1&

Theretore, the .Jrplanation of how the mind paBses tra

cond1 tioned inference to an unoouditioned ass.nt has in the main been account-

ed tor.

The nlative Sen.... however, has stUl a further relation to assent.

For the mative Sense is affected and mod1tied by the man as he is, by the
concrete man With his pasSions, prejudice., blindness, and moral defioiencies.
The•• moral factors not only have their plac. when the Illative Sense perce1ves
and ooncludes to

assent.

truth, but also when the lllative Sense commands or sanctions

This sanction of the .p.l.atift Sense is the further relation to the act

. 14Ib1d., 317. "Of the two, I woUld rather have to maintain tba:t we ought
to begin Wi ttl believing everything that is offered 1#0 our aoceptance, than that
it is our duty to doubt of ever;ytb:l.ng. The former, indeed, seems the true way
of learniDg. In that oase, we soon discover and. discard what is oontradictory
to itself) and error hav.1.ng 81:_78 some portion of truth in it, and the truth
having a reality Whioh error has not, we may expect, that when there is an
honest purpose and fair talents, - shall somehow make our wa::! forward, the error falling oft tram the mind, aDd the truth d.eveloping and occupying it. If This
pMsage of itselt should be fair evidence against those who hint that Newman was
himself a soeptio.
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of assent.

Th1s sanotion, Moreover, operates in an area

or

freedom.

Because

man has a tree Will, the conclusion to truth does not always neeessitate or

ooeroeassent.

Man can refuse

to

give assent even to ascertained truth.

These

tacwn ot freedom, of wW, o! moral diSPDsition, and of sanction, there.fore,

ww.

be discussed further in the next, ohapter which tna ts the sanction ot the

mative Sense.

CHAPTER IV

THE SANCTION OF THE

ILLATIVE SENSE
Truth is the object of ....nt.

Theretore, onoe the D.lati.e Sens. bas

ooncluded to truth, usent should automaticauy follow.

The conclusion 1I.bich

the lUative Sense reaohes in Womal inferenoe is, oonsequently, the suffi-

cient basis of assent.
Aa was noted before, an 1n.tarenoe "1' bave two coneiitiona.

F1rat, the

conclusion of a formal in.ferencereao1les only' probability in ooncrete matters.
Secondly, the conclusion of 8D7 inference, whetber it be fomal, 1Df0ftal, or
natural, follows trom and depends on its praUs.e., no matter what the1r num.ber.
!be first obstacle of probabilitY'1s no hindrance to the IllatiYe Sense, slnce,
in ita use ot either informal or natural inferenoe, it ooncludes to truth.

The

second obstacle of dependence on premisses, which is operative in all. inference,
should also 'be removed in this , . . conclusion to truth.

Once a conclusion i8

reeogniHd aa true inllOfar as it proceeds from true premdsse., it can be recogn1ud .. true iD itself.

Then 18 no longer anY' need for premissea.

cluaion ruq be held as true e.,.n 1f the premisse. are forgotten.
bas perceived the truth ot one of ita eonoluaions, it need

DO

The con-

once the mind

longer remeniber

the prem1sses upon wbloh that oonollll1on depends.
With the ooncesaion of \be. . preliminary remarks, there would ba no further problem nth assent vere it automatically given to asoertained truth.
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But

$1
man can freely refuse assent, even to the truth which he recognizes.

The

pu~

pose of this thesis is to show bow the mind or Illative Sense passes from a
conditioned inference to an unconditioned assent.

This thesis then" in de-

scribing how the mind arrives at trath, the adequate basis of assent, has taken
only the first· step, for man baa free will and can refuse assent.

The question

MY be asked then whether the mati"e Sense has any further relation to assent
besides its task

or

reach1ng truth?

'lheanswer is yes, the nlative Sense is

also a sanction of &Ssent.
The purpose of this fourtb ohapter; therefore, wtil be to explain the
nlative Sense as a sanotion o! assent; for; in d.oing this; the full relation
of the nlat1ve Sense to assent w1U be made clear. and the process of passing

trom a conditioned inferenoe to an unconditioned assent will

be completed.

Canseqmmtly, tb1a chapter will first treat the act of assent as a .tree act.;

..cody, the Illatift SeMe as sanction; thirdly, the place of w1U in the act
o£ assent, and fourthly, the lanotion of the lllatift SeMe as an antidote to

rationalism and sceptioism.
Assent is a tree act, a P4l'rtJonal act tor which the agent is responsible. l
Newman seldom dweUs on this aspect of alsent, but its theme is implicit
throughout the Whole of the OraInar.

The importance of thi8

notion of treedOJ/l

for the supernatural act of futh can, of oourse, be readily seen.

ot

!he reality

the freedom of a8.ent can be tound both in experience and 1n argument.

fact of th18 freedom is experlent.iall;y eVident.

The

An assent 118 net thor the same

as an inferential conclus1on, nor is it just a confirmatory shadow which neces'"

$8

sar:Uy follows an inference •. Assents have a degree of independence, and this
independence is manifested in eveX7day life.

Newman lists two instances.

First

assents can taU while the reasons tor the are still in foroe. 2 Seoondl7.t
someti."Iles in spite of strong and convincing reasons, assent is withheld.)
The reasons for these seeming peculiarities are many.

In the case at a

failure of assent, one may find the cause in same rational difficulty which was
not considered before.

At other times the owe. of this failure cannot be dis-

covered.. and its implioit.reason may -11 be an illegitimate tear with its conseqaent destruotion of a personal oommitment.
M&l'l7 factors plq a role in the instance of an assent not given.

First,

prejudice, bad will, and other moral d1ftioul ties may hinder assent, and this
not onl,. in ooming to truth, but also in aooepting truth.

Newman quotes the

old rh1me as a case in point. flA man oonvinced against his will is of the Same

opinion still.·4 Seoondly, aasent being a tree and responsible act, one might
fear to cOOI1lit himselt too quickly, especially if the matter is of r.\01DEIut.'
'l'hirdly, the evidenoe in most at human reasoning is not oompulsive and doe8 not
necessitate assent.

Knowledge!or Newman is in moS't cues s result of a "Put-

ting together" of evidences.

dence and the mind.

"'Ibid., 169.

-

SIbid.,

In this process there are two elements, the evi-

The evidenoe is a mas8 of indioations whioh Singly or to-
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sether are but probable 1nrelation to the conclusion whioh the mind or Illa-

tive Sense ultimately reaches.

This conolusion is above and beyond the evi-

dence, and consequently, the evidence oannot force it.

There is, therefore, a

gap between the two which must be bridged by the Illative Sense.
the Will enters into the act

or

assent.

In this way

Beoause the evidenoe of itself is not

ooercive, the person concerned is thrown back upon his Illative Sense and ita
perfection, and upon his own moral perfection and disposition of wUl.Jood
wUl r.tay incline him to the aaoeptance of truth, but bad will may incline h1m
away.

:Finally, in that limited area. of strict demonstration and of fOlmal interence, the evidence, when it can lead t:> truth, has the power to command as-

sent.

However, eTen here, assent may be free, for the person involved can

still wUl. not to g1ve his assent.
Assent therefore 18 a tree act.
Sense have to this free act ot assent?
Sense is,

&8

What relation then does the illative
The ooncJ.us1on to truth ot the Illative

has been seen, the aurfieient basis of assent.

But the nlat1ve

Sense plays a further role; it ,is also a sanotion on assent.

The use of the term sanction might in this case seem strange.

Sanction

usually refers to the reward or pun1slllent which follows the oommission of a
good or ev1l deed, or which is the crown of

III

good or eVil lite.

Sanotion in

this sense also acts as a motive for good deeds or a deterrent from bad deeds.
Newman uses the word sanction in a different way.

Sanction for him does not

mean a reward or punishment; it does.. however, partake of the notion of a motive or deterrent"

One of the meanings whioh Webater' a Dictionary gives sanc-

tion is "that whioh induoes observanoe of law or custom ... 7 Newman uses the
word in a simUar way, as that which induces assent.

Thus the Illative Sense

in its perception of truth induces, or in a stronger senss, commands assent.

In what way can the Illatiye Sanse be said to

COI'!L'lIand

assent?

'l'he Ula-

t1.,.. Sense commands assent, or sanetions assent in the Newmanian sense or the
WQrci, by the mere faot that it has ooncluded to truth.

In this ""nclusion to

truth, the nlat1vs Sense acts according to its nature, which is to arrive at
tnth 1n concrete matters through

terence.

process of either informal or natural in-

This nature, as shall be seen, is an expression

ture of the mind.
18

til

or

the laws and na-

To retuss assent to such a oonclusion to trnth, there.tOl'e,

to violate one's mind.

The mative Sense

1S8

sanction, therefore, because

it 18 an expre••icm ot the human mind and its operations which must be followed

This is important in ooncrete circumstances, especially in matters of
ligi()n, tor 1n suoh

c.....

one OL"1l'1Ot

alWlqll

ava! t a strict deru:)nstr&tion.

JIlUIt act, and he wUl never aot 1..f he insists on

1'8-

One

strict proof' tor everyt.hing.

"Life 1& not long enough, ft Newm,an sqs, "for a religion of' ir-..tsrenc6:sJ we shall

never ba.. done beginning, it .. d.etamine to begin vith proof.

We shall ever

be laying our foundations • • • • We shall never get at our first prinoiple••

Resolft to belie.,.. nothing, and you l1lust proye

)"0Ul'

proof's and analyse your

elements, 8inking tarther and farther, and finding tin the lowest depth a lower
deep,. tUl you oome to the broad bosom of 8cept101SJ1l... 8
, f.

1Webster' 8 Di9tiona!71 P. 880,

8Newman, Grammar, P. 9>.

According to Newma.'1, the normal way of coming to truth is through a process of 1n:f'ormalinterenoe in which the ndndwi th its illative pO",,;er adds, as

1t were,st:I!Iething to its evidence.

Many men. however, theoretioally at leut,

refuse to give their assent to trnths whioh are not attained by a process of

striot logical thought.
probability.

It a proposition cannot be thus proved, they.tena it a

'l'hese men, therefore, often faU to .deoide, choose, and. act be-

. cause they are determined to await a strict logical demonstration.
pecially

tlUG

in mattera ot reJ.1g1on.

1his is es-

Ne1fl!lan oondemns such an attitude of mind.

He 8a1S. that in Mathematios one :1s JusUtled 1n not aseent1l'lg to a oonolU$ion

whioh 1s not demon.stratlvely proved.
of faith, one

c~t

In conoretematters, however, 1n matters

wait tor such strict proof; he mutt be. Qontent w1th

supple and les. so{entitlc lIlOde ot proof.

tJ'U8 concl1.l8ion through such a pl'OCe'B,

til.

More

t'ihen therefore one has dipoerne(i a

he hu a duV in consoience

to live hi.

unconditioned a.eant.9

twofold, being both in oonscience and in the sanction of the IDative Sense,. or
in the law

or

the IId.nd as the ,taundatlon for thi. sanction.

NeTllan constantly

emph.ul... the tact tba t man JIlUBt accept bimael.f as be 11S, a. he expel"1eatiaUy
ti.rldB b:SJueltI and not enduYorto owrload hi. experience wi tb a priori theo-

riee Whioh do not confomto reallty.10
and the laws of his mind.

'Ibid., hl2.

-

1OIb1d., 347.

In this, un must be open to conscience
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The mind with its illative power has laws according to which it operates.
One elementary duty of man is to discover these law8 and obey them. ll
these mental law8 is that assent
has been tound. 12

~1ould

One of

be given when truth or absolute proof

In this :Ls founded the sanotion at the Ul.a.tin Sense wb1ch

sanctions insofar as it· has ooncluded to truth through the instrumentality ot

lnform..al 1n.ference. . \\'hGn the Ulati ve Sense, therefore, concludes to truth
through this inferential process, and coM!IIa.."lds assent,
al temat1 va but to obey.

ODe

has no leidtiaate

It oneref'uses h1s assent, he Violates his mind.

The.. law. ot thea1ncl are tounded proximately in htUl&ft nature and ul....

t1makl.y in God H1.lIlselr. l )

'therefore, when one refuse. to assent to a truth

ascertained through iDtormaJ. Werenee, he not onl7 Violates his mind, but his
nature also and thewUl of 3od.

Consequently, one has a duty in conscien"e to

give assent to truth in matters short of demonstrat1on or perception.
frequently allude. to Ws duty 1n conscience throughout the

Newman

o.r.rnmar.1h

The nlative Sense then is a sanction by the mere tact that it has con-

e1ude<: to truth.

This conclusion to truth 1.8 an expression of Mental laws and

hUMan nature, and theretore ill'l'Olyes duty and conscience.

under this aspect of sanotion

can

1'm nlat1ve Sense

be fully understood only in this relation to

oonec1enoe which, in its cooperation 1f1th( the UlatiT8 Sense, as. .e. the tunc-

-

12Ibid.)

-

lJIbidll,

316.
347, )51.

6)
"Were it not for this voioe, speaking
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clearly in my conscience aDd my

heart, I should be an atheist. or a pantheist, or a polytheist when I looked

into the world ...15 Ne_an wrote these words in his AJ?olop.a describing the
importance o£ oonscienoe in his own personal lU'e.

So dominant is this voice

of oonscience in Newman's writings, that s(JIe critics like Henri Bremond have
not hesitated to call it the grand principle of his philosophical and religious
tbought,16 while others have tried to make conscience the basis of all ooncrete
knowledge in the Graaar. 17

of oonscience. however, 1s perbape best seen 1n 'the Grammar where for several.
pages Newman gives a conoentrated psychological description o£ ita na\ure and

operation.

He regards conscience first of all as an aot of the mlnd. 1B This

should be stressed because of the various "sentimentalist" interpretations often
attached to Newman'. thought.

l>t.e.an,

Aeol0i1a. p.

16HeJ'lr1 Bremond,
1907), p. l:13.

It is true that New.tnan uses words such as sense

2!U..

!!!. t1Y:ste;Z .2! Wena."l,

trans. H. C. Con-anee (London,

17Eoelaaad, Pp. 4O-hl, 284-285, 21$.. 299, 300. On page 284 Boekraad says.
"A new Philosophical problem thua contronts us. how 1s the individual mind related to the oonquest of truth. Newman solved it by reducing the whole of our
efforts and actions as ind1viduals to conscience as the normative principle
goveming the mind as well in ita activities. If conscience is disregarded,
there is the poeslb1l! V that the Dti.lld w1ll run Wild to destroy itself finally
in scepticism. '1'0 prevent thiS, Newman maintains that in the individual it ls
es_nUal that the exercise o£ the mind should be regulated by fideli t1 to conscience. Conscience, therefore, has to be respected if' we wish to settle ques-tions of truth ln the concrete, and t.hat is why Newman, in dealing with the
acquisition of truth in the concrete, reduced the question of the capacity of
the individual mind for truth to conscience as its ultimate basis. It

18Newman, Grammar,

~
P. 10;1.
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and feeling

to describe conscience.

be pr1ma.rUy one of teminology.

But the difficulty whioh arises seems to

Ne1Iman gives an analysis of oonsoience in the

ooncrete, in a person as he or she actually is, With intellect, wUl, and emotions.

Feeling, then, means not just an emotion without rational. grounds, but

rather a recognition attended by emotions.
&8

he does in nlative

l~()reover,

Newman uses the word sensJi

Sense, with a significance similar to good sense 2£

~

...... 19

moll 8en88.
-;;;;,;;..;;

Conscienoe viewed as a mental. act has two aspeots.

1he first aspect is

conscience acting as moral sense; the second i8 conscience acting as a sense ot

duty.3D Conscience as moral sense 18 an habitual abstraot recognition that oertain aots are in themselves right Gr wrong.

It is the speculative lmowledge of

moral. values, the conviction, tor example, that stealing is wrong or .that "Itneritioe is good.

This reoogni tion, which originates in experience, usually

both precedes and tollows upo.n one's acts. 21
Conscienoe as a sense of duty, on the other hand, is the awareness of
personal well-being or guilt which fOllows the oOlllllission of a good or evU aot.
This aspeot ot conscienoe,

whi~h

1s attended by emotion, implies the reCognition

that certain acts are not only wrong in 't.hemselves, but forbidden also to me,
individual, in this particular case.21

-

19Ibid.,

316.

2OIbld., 105.

-

2llb1d.

all

6,
It is important to note that neither aspect of oonsoience thus rar dealt
with in the Grammar corresponds to what i8 usually meant by consoience, that

is, either the faculty

ot discem1ng right or lIrOn{b or, and this pr1marUy,

the partioular applioation of a gefteral. rule of right or wrong..

For, oonacieme

as moral senae i8 habitu.al, abstrao\, and general, whUe conaoienoe as a sense

of duty follows after a good or evil deed.

Ebwever, it wUl. be seea that New-

man does give the. further meanings to oOll8Oienoe ..
The real iJ!1portance of oonscience in Ie_an's mind i. ita function as a
source of knowledge,

Both oonscience a8 moral senae and as a sense of duty are

sources of knowledge, the one of etical knowledge, the other of religious
knowledge. 2)

'lhe immediate conoem·o1: thia ohapter is conscienoe as a source

of ethioal knowledge, although c0na01ence u

a teaoher of religion will be men-

ttoned later.
How are general rules of oonduct applied to particular oases?

one know that a partioular 1ns1Mmce tits under the general rule"

12 !e!. E!!!!!!!
science.

How does

In his Letter

Norfolk, Newman dist1ngu.1shes a third meaning of the word !!!!!-

Conscienoe under

tbi~

general rule ot right and wrong.

third aspeot is the particular application of a
nSecondly, I obaerve that conscience is not a

judgntent upon any speoulative trttth, any abstract dootrine, but, bears immediate-

11' on oonduct, on SOMething to be done or not done.

• Conscienoe,' saya St.

Thomas, • is the praotioal judgmen't or dictate of reason by which we judge what

---

hic .t nunc is to be done

8S

being good, or to be avoided as

eV'1l.,"24

23Ibi~, 106, 389-,390

24John

I,

256.

Henry Newman, Difficulties.2! Aru5!1oans, New edition, (London, 1896),
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.2! Assent. which was written
!2 !!!! ~ 2!. Nortolk.. this aspect of

In the Grammar

the Letter

only four years earlier than
oonsoience is under the di-

rection of the Illative Sense vb1ch becomes the faoulty.ot discerning right
and wrong in the partioular inStanoe.

Newman notes in the Grannar that the

n ..

lat1ve Sense is the orsanon inv..t1i!e21 in all conorete matters, including
those of duty_ 2$ When Neaan comes to define the action of the mative Sense

more fully, he compares it to Aristo'tJ.e's phronesis,. except that the nlative
Sense has u

its provlooe the whole range of oonorete matter.

The illative

Sense then functions as conscienoe in oontingent oiroumatanoes, applying gener-

al rules to partioular instances of conduct. 26

Newman therefore identifies the Illative Sense with conscienoe as the or·
gam ot discerning the particular applioation of right and wrong.

When one

:realizes, tor example, that in this partioular case he is bound in conscience

ta

give assent to a non-detllonstrative conclll8ion, this function of consci8ftCe

18 the task of the Illative Seae.
~t

The souroe, however, of the general. rule

the laws of the mind must be obeyed is not necessarilY'

~

operation of

the lllaUve Sense through the ,instrumentality of either natural or intomal

inference, but can be had from one 1mmediate elCper1.enoe. 27 Conscience as moral

25Newman, Grammar, p • .317.

26cr.

PP. 2B-JO in ohapter two o:t this thesis.

27 Newman, Grammar, p. 65. "1 am not of oourse dreaming of denying the objective existence of the Moral Law. nor our instinctive recognition of the im...
mutable difference in the moral quality of acts, as elioited in us by one instance of them. lSf'en one aot of crueltY', ingratitude, generoSity, or justice
reveals to us at once intenSive the immutable distinotion between those qualities and their contraries; that is, 1n that partioular instance and pro !!!! .!lee. From suoh elCperience--an experience whioh is ever recurring--we prooeed to
abstract and generalize."
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sense, therefore, is not neoessarily identified with the mind

~

Illative

SeMe.
Since, therefore, oonscience as moral sense is not of necessity one and
the same as the Illative Sense, the source of the sanction of assent remains
two-fold, being rounded proXimately in the Illative Senae insofar as it concludes to tru.th and. thus expresses the normal operations and laws ot 'Wie mind,
and ultimately in oonsoience as lllOr'al sense whioh usually has its groWld in

tmmedlate experience, or, as Newman says, in intuition.
For these reasons, the Illative Sense must cooperate with oonscience in
its oonclusion to truth in cono:rete matters.

This cooperation increases or di-

minishes in proportion to the sel.f'-c.lomml tment demanded by the matter under. consideration or already concluded.

In matters

of religion, where this self-com-

m1 taent is difficult and highly dE!:l'tWldln.g, the process

ot ax'rlving at truth and

assenting to it must be done under a sense of duty and With a close cooperation
vlth conscience.

In this sense perilaps can be understood the position of

Father Boekraad who reduces all efforts in the attainment and atfirmat10n of
truth to conscience as the ul ~te basis. 28
The tact that assent in concrete .atters is a tree act, and the fact that
the n1ative Sense in its conolusion to and affimation of truth must cooperate

wi th consoience as moral sense. reftal the strong and direct intluenoe which
the will has in the aot of assent.

In the Grammar Newman hardly ever explicit-

11' mentions the will as a factor in knowledge.

In various of his letters,

68
however, he does etnphasize the wUl, espeoially when speaking about an aot of

supernatural faith.29
As was noted in ohapter th.t-ee, the conclusion to truth in ooncrete matters ls made by way of indirect judgment.

That ls, the oonolusion is rather

foreseen or predicted than actually attained, for the evidence of itself does
not logically touch the conclusion.
negative torm..
good as proved.

'l'he judgment involved, therefore, takes a

The oonclusion cannot be otherwise; it 1s inevitable; it i8 as
Because of this gap bet.ween evidenoe and conclusion, beoause

the evidenoe oannot of itaelf compel either a oonolusion or the consequent assent, the mind with its illative power is not ileoessitated to draw a oonolusion

or give assent.
and assent.

In

m~

cases, however, the mind reoognizes a duty to conolude

In this area ot indirect proof, conscienoe, and duty, the Will

enters in and exerts its influance over the mind, assisting or hindering it in
its acts ot ooncluding and assenting.

A parallel example may be found in the

1IIOl'd8 of St. Ignatius: "For although this faoulty (the understanding) has not
the freadom whioh the will has, and naturally assents to what i8 presented to

it as true, there are, however, l'!lImY instanoes where the evidence of the known
truth is not ooeroive, in whioh it can with the help of the will favor one side

or

1;he OWl'. ,,30

It is quite olear, therefore, that one's disposition of heart and Will

enters intI) the act of assent to truth.

Moral faotors have their role not only

29Ward, pp. 242, 276. On the latter page, Newman is quoted as saying " •••••
as 10u Will see, sbe oontuses the conclusion tram evidenoe, with the act ot
assent whioh depends on the ~.Q

-

"St. Ignatius of Loyola, ....................
Letter On ...................
Obedienoe,
......., trans. VIm. J. Young, S.J •
(New York, 195), p. 10.

in the conclusion to truth, but also in the assent to or acceptanoe of truth.

As was seen before, Newman explioitly notes the effeot at prejudice, fear, and
bad will on the act of assent, especially in their role of hindering or ob-

struct/ing ;this act.
In summary, this chapter has shown so far that assent is a tree aot in
concrete reasoninJ, that the Illative Sense in its conolusion to truth aots as
a aanction for assent, that in this function as sanotion, the Illative Sense
must oooperateWith oonscienoe, so that as a result conscienoe assumes the form

of a co-sanction.

This ohapter 1143 also desoribed the oonsequent influence of

the Will over the act of assent in ooncrete matters, ;md, briaJ.:l.y, the necessi-

ty ot good Will or good disposition.

1astJ.y, there remains to be seen the Man-

ner in which Newman applies the Illative Sense and oonsoienoe as antidotes
against rationalism and scepticism.
The unity of Newman's 1U'o must be seen in his almost continuous struggle

against religious rationalism, or, u

he

80

often oalled it, liberalism.

'rhe

main tenets of this liberalism, and its implications have already been discussed
in the first chapter. 31

l~ewm~ts chiei' objeotion against this rationaliSDl,

especially as expressed in the teacbines of John Locke, is that it limita the
attainment of truth in ono-perceptual matters to a process of formal inferenae
or syllogistic demonstration, to a strict correspondence between eVidenoe and

conclusion.

Such a doctrine, Newman maintains, in no way conforms to experi-

ence and to the noma1 operation of the human mind.
from formal inference and logical

llcr.

~AmOnstration

pp. )-6 in chapter one of this thesis.

Newman's own drift away

as methods suffioient for all
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investigation opposes, as is eVident, this type of rationalism.

In practice rationalists did not themselves demand this striot proal tor
every f'act or duty to which they gave an unconditional assent, and in conae-

quence their abstract and a priori theories were only paper theories.

However,

thie ref'usal. on the part of many' to decide and acoept on evidenoe abort of' del'ftonatration or actual perception i8 one of the basic cawses assigned by 5e_an

tor SCeptic1SM.)2 Newman was oonviftced that anyone who resolved to give assent
only to that which was brought .home to hill by strict proof would gradually

doubt one truth atter another

UDm

be ended 1:0 oomplete soeptioisrn.

This vas eSp8ciaJ.l.y' true 1D utters of religion.

In his ARoloi!a,

l~ewaan

calla this tendencyof' the IIl1nd DtIbe all-corroding, aU-dissolving lIOeptioiam
of ~ intellect in relig10u iIlq,u1rt••• fill

While Ne_an does not deny that

tl'Uth 1s the object of the intellect, he does main.tain that fallen man 1s being

dealt With.

"I .. not spealdng here of right reasOll, but of reason as it acts

in fact and concretely in fallen
when oorrectly exercised, leads

soul, and in a future

man. I

know that even the unaided reason,

to a belief in God, 1n the 1.mmortal.lty of the

retribn~onJ

but I _ oonsidering the faculty of' reason

aetually and h1storica:l.ln and in tbis point of view, I do not think I am wrong
in 8.;ring i til tendency i8 towards • l11Jlple unbelief in matters of' religion. 1134
!he solution to this problem ot rationali.., especially religious ration-

aliam, 1s the Illative Senae under the aspect

)2N8'II1IWl, GJ'8IIftlsr" p. 9$.

llNewman, ~0l!!,

-

34Ibld.

p.

243.

at

lIanction and in cooperation

n
with conscience.

As

has been seen, one knows the dUrerences between right and

wrong through conscienoe as moral sense.

One

primary lesson which man must

learn 1s the duty of aooepting himself and his nature as law.

Consequently.

one JIlUt obey the laws or his nd.nd. whioh are not only the manifestation at his
nature, but also, ultimately, of God's wisdOll'l and will.

Tbe mind or mati"

Sease, theretore, in it. oonclusiOft to truth, aots as a sanotion ot anent.
0118

It

doe. not obey and give assent, he Tiolate. both his JIlind and his nature.

one becames obligated in consaienoe, therefore, to giye assent.

This 18 ea-

pea1.all,. important siDae 1n oOllCrete matters truth i8 not attained through a
proces. of fomal Werence.

Sane men of a rationalistio bent balk at this and

oonequentl,. violate their Blind and nature b,. refu8ing to aocept

aD)"

conclusion

u:aocmd1tional.ly which is not atta1ned by mean. of a full,. explicit logioal de-

A good example

ot thi. can 'be .een in the

way

in which lfe. .n proves the

existence of God.)S Newman proves God, not through a proces. of strict d_on-

st.ration, but rather through conaoieftoe .a a sene ot duty.
senee of duty, as wUl be

reIIl~bered,

(bnso1enoe as •

is the recogn! tion of personal. well-being,

or guU t whioh follow. atter the CO!IBIl1ss1on of a good or evU deed.

rus

aspect

at oonsoience, whioh is always attended by emotion, implies the reoognition
tbat oertain aots are not only good or bad in themselve., 'but also enjoined on
O.J." forbidden to me, an indiTidu&l.

Newaan t • argument to Ood develops the 1m-

3~e1lllAll, Gr..u.r, p. lOS. Newman'. purpose here i8 not pr11'llarUy to prove
through conscienoe that Cbd e:d..ta, a.1 though be actually does do th1.s. He
wishes rather to show holf one apprehends God and gives a real. assent to Him.
"nowever, I repeat, what I am directly aiming at, i8 to explain how we gain an

image of God and give a real assent to the proposition that He eXists."
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plioations

or

the emotion which attends an act of oonscience as a senae of duty.

Newmants proof for

(bd

can be summarized in three steps.

soienoe lead. to emotions of reverence, awe, hope, and fear.)6

First, con-

Secondly, one

feels emotions, espeoially such emotions as here listed, only in the presence

of a penon, butneYer when confronting a mere object. J7
therefore, impli•• a person.

'fh1rcily, conscience,

"These feelings in us are such as require tor

their cause an intelligent being.Q)8 Furthermore, consoienoe implies One who

is not man's equal, but who issupe1"1or to man, One who is

I1UU1 t

s Lord and Mas-

ter, Who i8 h1s lawgiver, and to whom man is responsi'ble.

In short, consOience

for Newman implies God. 39
ThiS knowledge of Ood depenc:la on an 1mplioit, almost spontaneoUB act

reuoning.

or

'fbrough a number of oonfrontations with oonscienoe, and through

vari.oufJ, almost 1mmediate proces... of weighing and balancing, one gradually

d1soerns the presence of a lav, aDd oonel.ud.es from this that where there is a
law, there i8 aleo a lawgiver and judge.

'fhis process is carried on by the

mative Sense through the instrumentality ot either natural or informal inferenoe.

This argument to Clod t~ugh conscience i8 perhaps the basis of Ne'illU&ll t s

-

36Ibid., 108.

37Ib1d., 109: If~fo wonder then that it (consoience) always implies what that
sense r;;r-the beautiful) only sometimes implies) that it alvays involves the reoognition of a living objeot, towards whioh 1t is directed. Inanimate things
oannot stir our aftections} these are correlative With persons. If, as is the
case, .. reel responsibUity, are ashamed, are .frightened, at transgressing the
voice ot oonscience, this impl1es tbat there 1s One to whom we are responSible,
betore whom ve are shaaed., vhGSe cl&i.Jll8 upon us we tear."

-

38Ib1d., 110.

-

39 Ibid.
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belief in Ood of the ;:rears 1843 a..'ld

1844~ which, he

wn tes,

was founded "on a

ground of probability. ,,40

Through oonscienoe as a sense of duty, therefore, man oan attain a knowledge of God, which, although more or less implicit, is able to command assent.
A religious

rationalist will reject this knowledge of, God, whioh he himself may

bave previously accepted, on the ground that it has not been really proved to

him.

Clearly, this rejeotion is in Newmants eyes a violation of the sanotion

of the Ulative Sense and of oonscience.

consequaneeJ it leads to scepticiSm.

But suoh a rejeotion has a further

On the other hand,.it is just this kind

at knowledge of God through conscience which is a powerful. deterrent to extreme
rationalism and sceptioism tor the simple reason that such

knQ~edge

1S based

on a supple and informal mode of proof which, although it does not sa.tisfy the

strict

l~qui.~ents

of SCientific demonstration, proceeds nevertheless accord-

ing to the laws of the human mind and the laws of human nature.

,.

Wet. p. 47 in chapter three of this thesiS. See also Ne1I!ft8n, !Eqlos!a,
p. 241: "Were it not for this voioe, speaking so olearly in my conscience and
l'II7 heart, I should be an atheist, or a pantheist, or a polytheist when I looked
into the 'WOrld." Thes. words were written about ten yea.rs attar 1844. One
wonders whether Newman's grounds of oonviotion would have ohanged radioally in
that space of time.

OONCLUSION
This thesis haa attempted to 8.lpla1n the relationship between

mative Senae and the act ot a.ssent..

r~elJn1a.n's

This relationship is most clearly re-

vealed i t the passage trOlll a oondit10ned inference to an unOQndi tioned assent
is studied.

In such a pu.sage, one rises from a condi t10ned interenoe to a

point where he is justified in giving his unconditioned aBsent.
'1'wo obstacles 6at be overcome before the independent act ot cenain as-

sent can be given.

First, tor.aal or demonstrative inferenoe reaches only pro-

babUit)" in concrete matter.

Secondly, the inferential oonclusion, whether it

be the conclll"ion of a remal.. 1ni"omal, or natural inference, necessarily d....

pends upon its premisse..
tainS to truth.

These ebatacles can be removed it and when one at-

oonquest of truth in the conerete, therefore, becomes the

The

first and most iIlportant problem to be solved.

'l'he

question as to how the mind

ar:r1ves at truth in non-perceptual matters i8 then Newman's ma1n d1tflculty.
His solution lies in the operation

or

the Illative Senss, in the power ot the

Dd.Dd to judge CO%Teotly in conUngeat oiroumstanoes.

This oonoluaion to truth

wh1ch the mative Senae draws i8 the most basic and Dlost important relation of

the Illative Sense to the act of assent.

One the Illative Sense has ooncluded to truth, the aot of assent should
automatically follow.
sia ot assent.

But

One bas disoovered truth, and truth i8 the adequate ba-

the act of assent in ooncrete
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matters remains a free act,
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beoauoe the conclusion which the Illative Sense draws is above and beyond the
eVidence presented.

E.'ven when one has discerned the truth in

ing, he is not necessarily forced to assent to this truth.

conc~te

reason-

The Illative Sense,

however, inso.far as it concludes to truth, acts aa a sanction on assent and
makes ita duty in conscience for one to assent.

As sanction the Illative

Sense acta in cooperation with conscience which assumes the role o£

co-san~tion.

In this area of consoience, freedom. and duty, the wUl enters in and exerts i t8
influenoe on the mind.

Here espeoially is seen the influence of moral factors

on the intellect and the consequent need of good will and good moral. oharacter.

In the interests of further clarifioation and by way of oonclusion at
this study, a few summar.r remarks concerning Newman's epistemology will be add-

ed.

Newman, first of all, treats of reasoning and the aoquisi tien of truth in

conoretd mattt3rs where, he says, tOl'l'l'.a.l inference (verbal reasoning, syllogiStic reasoning, strict demonstration.) is inadequate.

Newman' 8 task becomes,

therefore, an analysi8 of the operations of the mind.
truth?

What 1s the true methodology of the mind?

How does the mind attain

These problems are important,

for Newman greatly extends the.limits of' concrete ma.tter and concrete rea.soning,
while the realm ot abstract reasoning is con-espondingly restricted.

One fur-

ther reason for Newman-s interest iD the ooncrete lies in the tact that concrete truth stirs the will and emotions and leads to action and practice.
The true methodology of the Mind in concrete matters 18 twofold.

named natural inference, the other informal inference.

One is

These two types ot in--

ference differ mainly aoeoI'<iing to the degree of eJIPlicitness and consciousness
with which they proceed.

NeW1'l1Q.J1 1s pr1lllarUy interested in informal interenee

in the Grammar, perhaps because the eJep11ci tne.s and fuller consciouan8as of in-
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formal inference make it a more apt instrument tor investigation.

Informal in-

ference, like natural in.t:erence, is supra-los-ieal and carries out and applies
formal inference in ooncrete matters.

Informal inference is a. method by which

the wJlnd or Illative Sense rises to truth from an accumulation of converging
probabilities.

In suoh a process, t.he evidence taken by itself is but probable

in relation to the conclusion which the Illative Sense reaches.

true even when the evidenoe is taken as a whole.

This holds

There is, therefore, a gap

between the conclusion reached and the evidence, and this gap must be bridged
by the Illative Sense.

The Illative Sense bridges this gap by discerning the

liMit or the point toward which the probabilltiesconverge (1.t they do con-

vergeS) and then judging that this conclus1onor limit cannot be otherwise than
true.

'!'be illative Sense is hindered

or helped in this proces8 by its perfec-

tion and expGnenoe and by the l1iOJ:"alperfection ot the person
Various conclusions follow.

j'l1dg1n~.

First, knowledge tor l're.an is for the most

part a putting togetherot evidenoes.

The Illative Sense must discern inter-

oonnections and relationshipS between evidenoes.

Seoondly, the intellect or

maUve Sense is given a vast. role in the conquest and attainment of trut.h.
The mind is

not a JIlerEt passive receiver or spectator, but has an active part to

pla:r in its knowledge.
through a process

Th1rdly, the nomal. way or prooeeding

to t:ruth 18

ot 81 thar natural 1nterence or informal inference, 'both of

whioh are induotive, rather than through deduotive .rormaJ.. inference.

Fourthly,

in most ot human kn·:)wledge, there 18 an area of choice where the Will enters in,
and in which the moral perfection of the person has great influence.

In this

area where the evidence. is not oompulsive, the will can determine the direction
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which the Illati va Sense takes.

Aocording to Newman. this general i':Leld of

knowledge extends even to scientifio and philosophioal investiiation.
At this point various questions might arise.

Throughout this thosis, we

have tried to keep Within the tral"f!work of Newman's own thinking as he himself
has sketohed that framework in his Ess!;X

!!l ~ .2£!

Grammar

2£.

Assent.

But

further questions are legitL"l1a.te which ask how this teaohing of: t-lewman is r&lated to the traditional soholastic doctrine on the nature ot the intellect and
inferenoe.

Are Newman's teaohin£8 ultimately compatible with the theses of

schOlastic logic and psychology?

Or are the divergenoies so great that one

must ohoose to be either a Scholastic or a Newmanite?
merely repeat the tradi tlonal scholastic explanations

That Newman does not
sh~uld

be clear enough at

All the Pl'eCeding pages tlaloe an attempt to show the

this stage of the work.

oriGinality end independence of Newman's thinking.
The exact relationship, however, between Newmants doctrine and the more

standard explanations given in soholastio manuals is a more dUf1eult question.

A oomplete answer would be a book in itaelf.

However, a few tentative conolu-

sions can be drawn whioh will J,.ooata Newman's work in the larger context.
The majority of scholastio manuals treat of reason and reasoning as it

worked out by-Aristotle in his
mentaries on Ar1stotJ.e.

~ios

and developed by Aqu1nas in his oom-

This is demonstratIve reasoning as it operates w1thin

speculative knowledge as formally scientifio.
their explioit

trea~~ents

AristotJ.e and Aquinas devote

of knowledge and reasoning to knowledge as scienoe.

Suoh l'ormaliMd knowledge is essentially abstl'&ct, universal. and prooeeds
il¥ilci! from principles

was

m

to conolusions. Contingent individuals tall outside

the oonoern of sOience as sucD, and knowledge of theae oontingent individuals

78
does not pertain to the perfeotion of speculative knowledge. 1

It is this for-

mally abstraot and speoulative knowledge which serves as the matter for reflection when Aristotle and Aquinas take up the logical and psychologioal. questions
of knowledge.

Tbey are for the most part content to restrict their disctlss1.ona

ot know1edge to knowledge
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soienoe.

There the inferenoes are fomal,# not

natu.ral or informal; the data are ;Ibstraot and. universal, not ooncrete and particular.

The writers of the manuals oontinue to adopt trJ.s same point of view

in their treatments ot knowledge, and thereby by-pass the precise area in which
ne'Hlllall is working.

Consequent.ly, th1sstudy conoludes that not only does New-

r.umts teaching on infomal inf'erence not contradict or contlict with the positions ot traditional soholastic doctrine, but it oan and should be used to l!'IUpplP..l11ent and complete what would otherwise rerudn a diSCUSSion of oll1:,· one t)'pe

of intellect and its proper functions to studythenl independently of the other
powers of man, there is still need ft:)r a diSCUSSion

ot intellect preoisely as

conJoined to the sense powers (oocnitive and appetitive) and the will in oomposite opEQ.·ations that.. though. unaoientific.. Nmain knowledge nonetheless.

It

1s precisely in this area of unscientifio, informal inference that tletllan has

given us new lights and insic;hts that, have the corroboration of our own noetic
exper:i.enoe.

Newman has not oontradioted tradi tional

8oholastioi~

but has ~

dertuUy enriched it •

.

lc. a., III, 75 (LM, )12): rtC'o~'1itio speeulativa magis perficitur in uni...
versalI quam in particulari." ct. also !.!., III, U, 1 ad 3. It• • • cognitio
s1ngularium non pertinet ad perfectionem a.nima. intelleotivae secundum cognitionem apeoulat,iv_. 8
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~tfhich

'!'he preoise Mode, however,

infornal inferenoe follows in coming to

its conolusions, namely that of the convergenoe of probabilities, has been objected to by some scholastios such as Father

~tAroy.

On the other hand, llred-

eriok Wilhelmsen finds it difficult to see how Newman can be rejeoted on tills

pOint, and adds that

poSition Beerl1S to be a definite advance beygnd

"rlel'elants

the older tradition on the subject of oertitude. ,,2

On this point, then, there

is no complete uniformity among Sch<>lastios.
There have, at course, been many wI).) have disagreed wholly or in part
with !fewJ'lltm'S oonclusions in the 'lrammar
critic must approach and judge

Ne~n

2! A.ssent.

However this mAY be, the

on his own ground.

NeWlll8ll f s method 0.:

approaoh, tar .t'rOl!l being based on a priori theories.. is founded on exper.tcnce
and renection on experience.

His method is psyohological and prooeoos by way

of anslJi'1Jis c1: the mind as it actually operates in the concrete.

Newman, as has

been seen, adm! ttedly hated a priori theories shoWing how the mind should

He wu an ardent realist in his

Throughout tbe Grammar.
faots, to the ooncrete world.

avoW8~

~ants

~Je

tor there is not.hing else to u.se.

work.

that against the facts there is no $.rgu-

endeavor is to go back to things, to

are in the world ot facts, and we use them;
'tve do not quarrel With them, bu.t we take

them as they are, and avail ourselves

ot what they ca..'11 do for us. ,,3 TIis object,

he says, is not to theorize, not to become a metap~sician,4 but to allow the

J.,

2prederiok D., Wilhelmsen, Mants KnowledJe.2! RealltZ (Englewood Cliffs, U.

19;6), p. 174-

3NtNaan, CW...-.r, p. 346.

4~., 343-344.

ct.

also pp.

160, 164, 166, 176.

00
ooncrete wjrld to

L~press

in the concrete and

hoW-I

itself on him and to discern what things actually are

they actually operat.e.

Newman# therefore, seV8rElJ..y

critioizes John Locke e..'ld the rationalists bocaus6, not

li3te:ni~!

of being, they impose their own theories on the concrete world.

especially in the case Qf. the opera. tion oJ: the mind.

to the voioe

This is true

These a priori theories,

however, do not fit the facts; !:.bey C.!t:lOot be can'ied out into practice.

New-

man says of Locke: "Be (Locke) takes a view of the human mind, in relation to
inference and assent, which to me seems theoretical and unreal. • • • • and that,
as I think. because he consul ts his awn ideal. of how the mind ought to act, in-

stead of' interrogating human nature, as an existing t.hing, as it is round in
the world. 11)
Newman, on the other haQd, begins by inquiring "what the elq:>erienc(.: of
human lite, ~"3 it is daily brought before us, teaches us. ,,6

fT.e treat.s the sub-

ject of assent and inference "not a.ccording to a priori 1'itnestJ, but a.ccol'ding

to the fa.ots of h'Wtla..'1 na.ture, as the;r are found in the concrete action of
life."7 Because of this return to the things themselves, beoause of the endeaVOl'

to strip the mind ot preju<U.oes, opinions, and theories, Itewman baa been

called a phenomenologist by some. although his works antedate Husserl'. by al-

most halt a century.8

SIb1d.. 164.

-

6Ib1d., 166.

-

7Ibid., 116.
8Boekraad, Pp. 137-1.39. JUson in his introduction to the Image Book edition o£ the Grammar (New York, 1StS» oalls it Ita phenomenology ot rel1g:Lous be-

liet."

The taots to whioh Newmall goes back are ultimately the facts and Edperiene•• ot his own lite.

Some inkling ot this oan be seen 1n this

then,'

quotatlon. from the A2S!loiia Vbich recounts Newman t s gradual conversion.

u.e of
In t18

CJrammaIt Newman'. applioation ot hU thoughts in chapters five and t.eft reveal a
F

justifioation in

~erienoe

ratberthan a true applioation.

Newman

~ng1y

8aId up hi. method of approaoh intbea. WOrdel

I begin with express:l.ng a MntiMent, Whioh is habitually in 'ffJ7
thoughts, whenever they ue tumed. to the subjeot of Jlental or IIOral.
soience • • • that ln the.. pJ"OVinoes of in<l\l117 egott_ ls \nte
modesty. In religious i.nqu1l"7 each 01: us can Speak only tor b1asel.t,
and for biaselt he haa ar1gllt to speak. His own experience. are
enough for b.1.uelf, but he -..not apeak tor others. he cannot. lay
d01ftl the law) he OaB onlJ' bl'tDa h1s own opertenoes to the OCll8Ol1
stock of psychologioal
He knows what has satisfied and 8at1..
tle. b1mselfJ it 1t satlld'i.eIt b1a.. lt 18 11kel7 to sat1ety othen,
1£, •• he belleyes and 18 ...., it 1s true, 1t will a.ppro... itself
to others also, for then 1M but one truth • • • But, however ,",,-t
may be, he brings together h1a :reaaons, and relles on thai, because
the,. are his own, and thie 18 hi. pri.Jl&ry' evideno., and he baa a
second ground of evidence, in \be testim.oftT ot those who agree with
him. But his best eVidence 18 the tonter, which is derived from hi.

t.,..

own thoughts. 9

That Newman' 8 attempt to analyZe the mind in its operations

11&8

not a

.f'a1lure 1. testified to even by his or1tios. 10 Father DtAroy, Who talces Newman

to task in several places, olaims nevertheless that he is Newman's disciple,
and that, although much has been written on the subject of a8sent and eert1.tllde

since Newman's day, "the .Or;;.;a
..III;;;;".&%,
.. !!E. Assent still remains the uaterpiece whioh
no

ODe

can safely neglect. "U Father Coleridge, the editor of

'Newman,

!!l!. Month,

who

Gr8Jllll8.1', Pp. )84-)6$.

lOfho1Iu Harper, "Dr. Ne11J.ll8.f1's Essay on the Gramma.r of Assent, tt

xu, (May 1870), 604.

Un,Aroy, p. 107.

!!'!! Month,
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remained in general non-oommittal toward Newman's work, admitted that "never,
we believe, have the manifold, and all but contradictory, compleXi. ties of the

human mind been treated with such unscrupulous reality.IJ.2
Newman himself was more modest about his work.
attempt, because he considered :1 t such.
1811, Netlllan gives hiw own judgment

!!t)

or

He oalled it an essay, an

In a letter to Father Coleridge in
his books "I am sensible it (the

.f!!:!!-

may be full of detects, and certainly charaoterized by incompleteness and

orudeness. but. it is something to have started a problem, and mapped in part or
a eountry, i.f· I have done noth.ing

1'1101"8.-1 )

Perhaps then defects may be dis-

covered in the Gruunar, perhaps too atter long and careful study it WUl be
.found to be not wholl7 satisfactory in solYing the problema it began Wit-h.

Then, however, Newman. s own opinion

or

his work must be rem_be red l i t 1s a be-

ginning, an attempt, a partial mapping out.

liB. J. Colleridpt "Dr. Newman's Essay on the Grammar or Assent, tt The
Mont:!> XII (March 1870), .366.
13John Henry Newman, Letters of John Hens: Newman" eel. Derek St.a.nford and
Muriel Spark (London, 1957), p. 2~.-
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